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A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE
THE HONORABLE PENNY J. WHITE*
INTRODUCTION
The American justice system has long been revered by
other countries for its distinctive quality - judicial independence.
Symbolized worldwide as a blindfolded1 Lady Justice, 2 its insulation
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
Before joining the faculty of the University of Tennessee College of Law, I
served as a trial and appellate judge in the state of Tennessee from September
15, 1990 until December 31, 1996. This article includes many opinions and
insights gained while serving as a judge and justice in the state court system.
This article grew out of a wonderful opportunity to participate in the
First Amendment Law Review's Symposium on judicial speech in the spring
of 2004, while I served as a visiting law professor at the University of North
Carolina School of Law. I extend my gratitude to the student members of the
First Amendment Law Review for allowing me to participate, and to Dean
Gene Nichol and the entire faculty at the University of North Carolina School
of Law for welcoming and embracing me during my visit. I also wish to thank
my colleagues Professors Otis Stephens and Joseph Cook for their counsel,
and Todd Reutzel, my research assistant, for his tenacity. While all of their
support is greatly appreciated, my deepest appreciation goes to Mike Okun, of
Patterson Harkavy, in Raleigh, North Carolina, and a graduate of the
University of North Carolina School of Law, for the many questions he raised,
most of which I did not sufficiently answer.
1. Scholars maintain that the blindfold was added to the justice imagery
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, coincidental with the
establishment of an independent judiciary, standing apart from the control of
the sovereign. See generally Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of
Justice, 96 YALE L. J. 1727, 1755-58 (1987). One explanation posits that:
Lady Justice is a blend of Themis and Justitia. The
blindfold with which Justice is now associated probably
started in the 16th century. In some of the Washington
D.C. statues, Justice holds scales, blindfolds, and swords.
In one representation she is fighting evil with her gaze,
although her sword is still sheathed.
N.S. Gill, The Goddess of Justice, ANCIENT CLASSICAL HISTORY -
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COMPREHENSIVE ANCIENT GREEK AND ROMAN HISTORY SITE, at
http://ancienthistory.about.com/cs/godsreligion/a/justicegoddess.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
Contrast the explanation offered by William Penn that:
Justice is justly represented blind, because she sees no
difference in the parties concerned. She has but one scale
and weight, for rich and poor, great and small. Her
sentence is not guided by the person, but the cause ....
Impartiality is the life of justice, as that is of government.
WILLIAM PENN, FRUITS OF SOLITUDE: PART I: IMPRACTICALITY 71 (11th ed.,
Lakeside Press 1906) (1693) (lines 407-411).
2. Historians have suggested that the image of Lady Justice is a
combination of Greek and Roman influences. Most attribute the image to
Greek and Roman figures. Themis, a Titan, appears in Greek mythology as a
figure whose role was to impose "some kind of order or control over
gatherings...." See Gill, supra note 1 (citing TIMOTHY GANTZ, EARLY
GREEK MYTH: A GUIDE TO LITERARY AND ARTISTIC SOURCES, VOL. I
(1996)). "lustitia, or Justitia, was the Roman personification of justice." Id.
Two of the many Lady Justice statues across the country bear particular
relevance to this article. One of these statues, located in Virginia City,
Nevada, and built in 1875, is seen peeking from behind her blindfold. After
the decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002),
this image prompts the question of whether justice across America will peek
from behind her blindfold in order to see who is watching.
According to a news report published in 1876:
The facade will be ornamented by a figure representing
Justice, with scales and sword that are orthodoxically
supposed to belong to her. In the drawing she is
represented without her eyes being blindfolded, which
may be objected by some as unconventional, but when
one considers that this representative dispenser of awards
and punishments will be compelled to stand out and take
all the sand thrown in her eyes by the Washoe zephyrs, it
will be readily conceded that her eyesight would not last
long enough for her to get so much as a glimpse of the
great wealth to be obtained by wickedly swaying the
scales of Right and Wrong. It makes but little difference
whether the blind is on or off.
RONALD M. JAMES, TEMPLES OF JUSTICE: COUNTY COURTHOUSES OF
NEVADA 137-39 (1994).
The second statue of particular relevance to this article is in Concord,
New Hampshire at the Warren B. Rudman Courthouse. Ironically, this
courthouse is said to be across the street from Justice Souter's barber. The
stainless steel statue of justice wears a full-length gown, but reaches above her
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from politics and influence has been its most coveted attribute -
until now. Some have described the "sea-change" 3 brought about
by the decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White' as a new
vision of judicial rights and obligations. Others have said it creates
a new landscape for justice in America. For many, myself included,
if indeed White offers a new vision, it is an extremely near-sighted
one, seemingly blinded to distant disasters; and, if White creates a
new landscape, the new terrain is very bleak.
When five members of the United States Supreme Court
elevated the process of winning judicial elections - with all its free
speech implications - above the process of doing and appearing to
do justice, the Court transformed justice in America. No longer
head to tighten the knot on her own blindfold. According to some, the
sculpture signifies that rather than being blindfolded by others, Lady Justice
"imposes the symbol of impartiality on herself." The Blindfold of Justice,
LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 68.
3. In Shakespeare's The Tempest, Ariel sings deceitfully to Ferdinand:
Full fathom five thy father lies;
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are pearls that were his eyes;
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 1, sc. 2.
Critics claim that the phrase "sea-change" is "almost always improperly
used and is greatly over-used," becoming "dull and tiresome." Paul Brians,
Common Errors in English Usage, at
http://www.wsu.edu:8080/-brians/errors/sea.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005)
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review). They caution writers to
"[a]void the phrase; otherwise you will irritate those who know it and puzzle
those who do not." Id. I accept the risk, believing that any word that is said to
mean a "large change caused by sea," id., and that has come to signify any
drastic, catastrophic change, even if technically inappropriate, is a fitting word
for the changes caused by the White decision.
4. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
5. While White dealt only with elected judges in state justice systems, the
general public's perception of justice is largely undifferentiated. The public
perceives justice as a whole, rarely distinguishing between state and federal
judges or trial and appellate judges. Nor does the public have sufficient
appreciation of the differences between trial and appellate courts. For
example, in my home state of Tennessee several death sentences have been set
aside by a federal district judge as a result of petitions for writs of habeas
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will citizens expect judges to only sift through facts, apply the law,
and render a verdict. Instead, citizens will expect judges to rule
based on views and opinions announced while campaigning,
unfettered by the uniqueness of the facts or the complexities of the
law.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effects that
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White is having on the American
system of justice. The article begins with a brief discussion of the
case and the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. The
second section discusses the perspectives of some of the justices
who made up the majority in this closely divided case. The third
section of the article describes the landscape of some state judicial
elections before and after White and details some of the
ramifications of the White decision. The last section of the article
discusses so-called "solutions," ways in which various states are
attempting to follow White while preserving judicial independence,
the centerpiece of the American judicial system.
I. THE DECISION
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a five-four
majority of the United States Supreme Court held that a provision
of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, in effect in Minnesota' and
corpus. See Abdur' Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (M.D. Tenn.
1998) (holding that death sentence was to be set aside due to writ of habeas
corpus upon grounds of ineffective counsel) rev'd, 226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir.
2000); Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 845 (6thCir. 1997) (holding that while the
murder conviction was affirmed, possible ineffective representation during
sentencing compels the court to remand the death sentence); Heck Van Tran
v. Bell, 145 F. Supp.2d 939, 942 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (holding that a murderer's
death sentence needs to be set aside until an accurate and uncontested mental
retardation assessment is performed). Some of the decisions have resulted in
new trials being granted decades after the crime, prompting public anger. In
one of my campaigns, which unfortunately followed closely on the heels of one
such grant of habeas corpus (and remand for a new trial), many voters
demanded to know why I had "set a killer free." My efforts to explain that I
was not "that judge" frequently went unheard, even when I pointed out that
the case in question had been tried before I completed elementary school.
6. Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct was
actually a part of the 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the
[Vol. 3
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referred to as the "announce" clause, violated the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The announce
clause provided that "a candidate for judicial office, including an
incumbent judge ... shall not announce his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues.",
8
Minnesota retained the prohibition despite its replacement
in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct by other provisions believed
to be "more in line with constitutional guarantees of free speech." 9
Those other provisions, referred to as the "pledges and promises"
clause'° and the "commitment" clause," rather than the announce
clause are in effect in the majority of states.
When a candidate for the Minnesota Supreme Court
challenged the constitutionality of the announce clause, 2 the state
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1974. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly,
247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2001). The American Bar Association (ABA)
amended the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990. The announce clause
was not retained. LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
JUDICIAL CODE 50 (1992).
7. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
8. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1996).
Throughout this article, the phrase "announce clause" refers to this provision.
9. MILORD, supra note 6, at 50. For a complete discussion of the
circumstances surrounding Minnesota's decision to retain the provision, see
Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L.
Carrico, One Who Exalted Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 649
(2004).
10. The "pledges and promises" clause, found in Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) of
the Model Code, provides that "[a] candidate for judicial office ... shall
not.., make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1996). Throughout this article, the
phrase "pledges and promises clause" refers to this provision.
11. The "commitment" clause, found in Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) of the
Model Code, provides that "[a] candidate for judicial office ... shall not...
make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect
to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." Id.
at Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii). Throughout this article, the phrase "commitment
clause" refers to this provision.
12. For a complete discussion of Gregory Wersal, his bids for the
Minnesota Supreme Court, and the lawsuits he filed challenging various
provisions of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, see White, supra note
9, at 629-31, 665-66.
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argued that the provision served two compelling state interests -
preserving the impartiality and the appearance of impartiality of
the state judiciary. 3  Although the district court and the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals described those interests as "compelling"
and "undeniably compelling," the Supreme Court majority held
that the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.14
The majority opinion in White was authored by Justice
Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas,
O'Connor, and Kennedy. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined the majority opinion without separate comment.
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to "express [her] concerns about
judicial elections generally."' 5  Perhaps most noteworthy in her
concurrence was her "assumption of the risk" rationale: since
Minnesota (and thirty-eight other states) chose some method of
judicial election, "the State has voluntarily taken on the risks to
judicial bias .... If the State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by
continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."
Justice Kennedy was less critical of the states' choice to
elect its judges. 7 He was equally critical, however, of the state's
attempt to restrict speech. Adhering to the viewpoint that content-
based speech restrictions "that do not fall within any traditional
exception should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow
13. White, 536 U.S. at 775. Justice Scalia attributes this characterization
of the state interests at issue to the Eighth Circuit. Id. (citing Republican
Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 867 (8th Cir. 2001). While the lower
courts also asserted the issue as one of preserving judicial independence,
Justice Scalia concluded that the parties were using the terms "impartiality"
and "independence" interchangeably. Id. at 775 n.6. This assertion allowed
him to focus his attention on the definitions of impartiality. Id. at 776-780.
14. Id. at 766.
15. Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 795-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[W]e should refrain from
criticism of the State's choice to use open elections to select those persons
most likely to achieve judicial excellence .... By condemning judicial
elections across the board, we implicitly condemn countless elected state
judges and without warrant.").
[Vol. 3
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tailoring or compelling governmental interests,"' 8 Justice Kennedy
joined the majority and concluded that "[elven the undoubted
interest of the State in the excellence of its judiciary does not allow
it to restrain candidate speech by reason of its content.' '9
Justices Stevens and Ginsberg authored dissenting opinions
in White.20  Justice Ginsberg wrote to expose the majority's
reasoning, which she described as a "unilocular, 'an election is an
election' approach., 2'  Her position, succinctly stated, was that
judges, though elected, are not political actors; therefore, the
unconstrained free speech rights that apply in political elections "do
not carry over to campaigns for the bench., 2  Similarly, Justice
Stevens concluded that "the flawed premise [of the majority
opinion] that the criteria for the election to judicial office should
mirror the rules applicable to political elections is profoundly
misguided. "3
II. PERSPECTIVE
24
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White is a staggering
decision, which will have, and is having, a dramatic impact on the
promise of equal justice in America. The decision is made more
problematic by its closeness: it is the result of a one-vote majority of
the Court. Certainly, five-four decisions are not a rarity, but the
White five-four division is particularly troubling because of the
21
obliqueness of Justice O'Connor's separate concurrence.
18. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. The two dissents were joined by each of the four dissenting judges.
21. White, 536 U.S. at 805 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 806 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Author Ingrid Bengis said "[p]erspective, I soon realized, was a fine
commodity, but utterly useless when I was in the thick of things." See
Lightsmith Publishing, "I Could Have Said That..." About Life, at
http://www.bcsupernet.com/users/lightsmith/quotelif.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review). Bengis's opinion is
particularly appropriate to this section of the article, which concludes that
some of the justices' perspectives on impartiality were influenced by the fact
that they were, indeed, in the thick of things.
25. See White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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While Justice O'Connor clearly agreed with the majority's
conclusion in White, she did so in an opinion that described, but
ultimately ignored, the damaging effects of the decision.26 Among
the effects of open judicial campaigning lamented in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion are these:
We of course want judges to be impartial, in the
sense of being free from any personal stake in
the outcome of the cases to which they are
assigned. But if judges are subject to regular
elections they are likely to feel that they have
at least some personal stake in the outcome of
every publicized case. Elected judges cannot
help being aware that if the public is not
satisfied with the outcome of a particular case,
it could hurt their reelection prospects. Even if
judges were able to suppress their awareness of
the potential electoral consequences of their
decisions and refrain from acting on it, the
public's confidence in the judiciary could be
undermined simply by the possibility that
judges would be unable to do so.
Moreover, contested elections generally entail
campaigning. And campaigning for a judicial
post today can require substantial funds.
Unless the pool of judicial candidates is limited
to those wealthy enough to independently fund
their campaigns, a limitation unrelated to
judicial skill, the cost of campaigning requires
judicial candidates to engage in fundraising.
Yet relying on campaign donations may leave
judges feeling indebted to certain parties or
interest groups. Even if judges were able to
refrain from favoring donors, the mere
possibility that judges' decisions may be
motivated by the desire to repay campaign
contributors is likely to undermine the public's
26. Id.
[Vol. 3
confidence in the judiciary.17
Justice O'Connor seemingly realized what was ahead for
her former state judge colleagues, but then absolved herself (and
the majority) of any responsibility.2
Perhaps mere recognition of the impact of the decision in
White by one of the majority justices should be applauded,
particularly in light of the views of judicial impartiality held and
exhibited by other members of the majority. A persuasive
argument can be made that the perspectives of Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist on judicial impartiality and the importance
of the public's perception of impartiality led to the analysis
employed in White. In other words, the personal opinions of these
justices dictated the result. Ironically, this is the very evil that the
announcement clause was intended to guard against.
An overly simplified argument could be made that federal
judges, who are appointed for life, may not comprehend the rigors
of becoming or remaining a state-court judge. They may be na've
about the process. Of course, many federal judges, including some
of the justices in the White majority, were previously state-court
judges.29 Thus, while there is merit to the argument that federal
judges may not fully appreciate the realities of judicial campaigning
and may lack perspective on the election process - that position is
not taken here. Rather, the position that I advance in this article is
that the White decision was reached because of the jaundiced
perspectives on judicial impartiality, and its appearance, held and
27. Id. at 788-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
28. See id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra text
accompanying note 16.
29. That experience alone does not necessarily give a judge an
understanding of judicial campaigns. Justice O'Connor, for example, seems to
believe that all of the problems she identified in her concurring opinion are
present only when judges are selected "through contested popular elections
instead of through an appointment system or a combined appointment and
retention election system .... " Id. Yet, she cites a law review article written
by Justice Grodin, one of three California Supreme Court justices removed
from the bench in an uncontested retention race laced with special-issue
politics. Id. at 791 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Joseph R. Grodin,
Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial
Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1969, 1980 (1988)).
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exhibited by some of the majority justices.
Less than a year after Chief Justice Rehnquist was
appointed Associate Justice,30 he had an opportunity to express his
opinion on judicial impartiality and its appearance. Respondents in
a case before the Supreme Court had petitioned for a rehearing in a
case based upon Justice Rehnquist's refusal to disqualify himself
despite his involvement in the case as a lawyer.3' While serving as
head of the Office of Legal Counsel to the President, attorney
• 31
Rehnquist had testified before the Senate as an expert witness. In
the respondent's view, Justice Rehnquist had previously adjudged
the issue before the Court when he publicly, in oral and written
testimony before the Senate, expressed his opinion on the issue.
Citing a long line of examples, Justice Rehnquist resolved the issue
simply:
The fact that some aspect of [a judge's]
propensities may have been publicly
30. The current Chief Justice, William H. Rehnquist, was nominated
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States by President
Nixon on October 21, 1971 and sworn in on January 7, 1972. He was
nominated Chief Justice by President Reagan on June 17, 1986 and sworn in
on September 26, 1986. Cornell Legal Info. Inst., Supreme Court Collection:
William Hubbs Rehnquist, at
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/rehnquist.bio.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
31. The issue of federal judicial disqualification is covered by statute. See
28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000). Numerous scholars have written about this statute and
related rules. See generally, e.g., Debra L. Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in
the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213 (2002); John P. Frank,
Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Rehnquist, Recusal and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589 (1987). Since the
specifics of recusal rules are not relevant to a recitation of what the justices
said they believed about disqualification and the appearance of impartiality, a
discussion of the specifics of federal court recusal is unnecessary and beyond
the intended scope of this article.
32. While serving as head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel to the White House, Rehnquist testified before the Ervin
Subcommittee on the subject of the statutory and constitutional authorization
of the executive branch to gather information. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S.
824, 825-26 (1972). In addition, Justice Rehnquist supervised the preparation
of a legal memorandum commenting on the appellate decision in the case
before the court, as well as other precedent. Id. at 828.
[Vol. 3
A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE
articulated.., cannot, in my opinion, be
regarded as anything more than a random
circumstance which should not by itself form a
basis for disqualification.
... [N]either the oath, the disqualification
statute, nor the practice of former Justices of
this Court guarantee a litigant that each judge
will start off from dead center in his willingness
or ability to reconcile the opposing arguments
of counsel with his understanding of the
Constitution and the law.33
In the end, Justice Rehnquist conceded that whether he
should disqualify himself was "fairly debatable," and an issue upon
which "fair minded judges might disagree."35 Nonetheless, he did
not find disqualification necessary. 36 Neither the public perception
of his participation as a justice in the case, nor the appearance of
impropriety was included in the discussion.37
33. Id. at 836, 838-39. Justice Rehnquist did differentiate between
statements made prior to nomination and statements made during
confirmation. For a nominee to "express any but the most general
observation about the law would suggest that, in order to obtain favorable
consideration of his nomination, he deliberately was announcing in advance,
without benefit of judicial oath, briefs, or argument, how he would decide a
particular question that might come before him as a judge." Id. at 836 n.5.
This is exactly the argument made by the respondents in White, which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, as a member of the majority, discounted. See White, 536
U.S. at 778-82.
34. Laird, 409 U.S. at 837.
35. Id. at 836.
36. It should be noted that one basis for the decision was Justice
Rehnquist's belief that Supreme Court justices had a heightened duty to sit
when not statutorily disqualified in order to avoid equally divided decisions by
the Court. Id. at 837.
37. The statute under which Justice Rehnquist analyzed disqualification
provided that
[a]ny justice... shall disqualify himself in any case in
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is
or has been a material witness, or is so related to or
connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit ....
2004]
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Two years after the decision on the petition to rehear in
Laird v. Tatum, Congress amended the federal disqualification
statute to provide that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate [judge] of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. ',18 It would
be thirty years before Chief Justice Rehnquist was called upon to
re-evaluate his view that a judge's personal opinion, not public
perception or objective appearance, determined whether a judge
should sit in a case. That re-evaluation would occur not when the
Chief Justice's recusal was requested in a case, but when members
of Congress, troubled by another Justice's failure to recuse himself,
asked the Chief Justice to explain the Court's recusal policy.
In March 2004, the Sierra Club asked Justice Scalia to
disqualify himself in Cheney v. United States District Court for the
District of Columbia,39 a case raising issues about compliance with
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act pertaining to
public records. 4° The Vice President, among the named defendants
from whom discovery was sought, had filed an emergency writ of
mandamus, seeking to vacate discovery orders. Certiorari was
granted when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
dismissed the motion for mandamus. The motion to disqualify was
based on a recent duck hunting trip on which Justice Scalia had
accompanied the Vice President. The motion alleged that "Justice
Scalia's vacation with the Vice President [had] led to reasonable
questions about the justice's impartiality. 41
Publicity concerning the Associate Justice's vacation with
42
the Vice President was intense and generally disfavorable. Some
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1973) (emphasis added).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
39. 124 S. Ct. 2576, 541 U.S. __ (2004).
40. See id.
41. Respondent's Motion for Recusal at 2, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for
the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004) (No. 03-475).
42. The Motion to Recuse is twelve pages in length. See id. The exhibits
to the motion cover fifty-six pages. They include cartoons, articles, and
editorials, with titles that are highly critical of Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Friend
of Court: Justice Scalia's Impartiality Highly Questionable, Hous. CHRON.,
Feb. 9, 2004, at 18; If it walks like a duck... , CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2004, at 26;
Judicial Arrogance: Scalia's Attitude in Cheney Case Reflects Badly on the
[Vol. 3
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legal ethicists and court veterans recommended that Justice Scalia41
disqualify himself in the case. It was at this juncture that Justice
Scalia's view on the importance of judicial impartiality and public
perception hinted at in White would be fully exposed.
Justice Scalia first responded publicly to the publicity in
January 2004 in a letter sent to the Washington Bureau of the Los
Angeles Times, apparently in response to a letter he received. In
the letter, Justice Scalia asserted:
I do not think my impartiality could reasonably
be questioned. Social contacts with high-level
executive officials (including cabinet officers)
have never been thought improper for judges
who may have before them cases in which those
people are involved in their official capacity, as
opposed to their personal capacity. For
example, Supreme Court Justices are regularly
invited to dine at the White House, whether or
not a suit seeking to compel or prevent certain
presidential action is pending. I expect that all
of the Justices were invited to the Vice
President's annual Christmas party. The
invitation was not improper, nor was the
attendance.4
A few days after Justice Scalia wrote to the Los Angeles
Times about his vacation with the Vice President,45 Senators Patrick
Supreme Court, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 18, 2004, at B8; Scalia's Blind Eye, L. A.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at B12; Shot in the Foot, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Feb.7, 2004, at 16; Supreme Contempt, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Feb. 6, 2004, at A12.
43. Professor Steven Lubet wrote in a Northwestern University News
Release that "[i]n a country in which no person is suppose to be above the law,
it is disturbing to watch Supreme Court justices ignoring basic principles
concerning conflicts of interest." Press Release, Steven Lubet, Northwestern
University School of Law, Court Reputation at Stake in 'Conflicts,' at
http://www.northwestern.edu/univ-
relations/mediarelations/releases/2004_03/lubettext.html (Mar. 9, 2004).
44. Respondent's Motion for Recusal at Exhibit 2, Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004) (No. 03-475).
45. The letter also advised its recipient, David Savage, that the "duck
hunting was lousy" but that Justice Scalia "did come back with a few ducks,
2004] 17
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Leahy4 and Joseph Lieberman 47 wrote the Chief Justice "with
regret.., to inquire about published reports that Justice Antonin
Scalia recently spent extended time with [the Vice President] on an
out-of-town trip." Ultimately the Senators asked what "canons,
procedures and rules are in place for Supreme Court justices to
determine whether they must or should recuse themselves.... .49
In a style reminiscent of his Laird decision, and
notwithstanding some criticisms of his position raised when he was
nominated for Chief Justice, ° Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to
which tasted swell." See id.
46. Senator Leahy, who is from Vermont, signed the letter as "Patrick
Leahy, Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary." See Letter from
Patrick Leahy and Joseph Lieberman, Members, United States Senate, to
William Rehnquist, Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court (Jan. 22,
2004), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200401/012204b.html [hereinafter Leahy &
Lieberman Letter].
47. Senator Lieberman, who is from Connecticut, signed the letter as
"Joseph I. Lieberman, Ranking Member, Committee on Governmental
Affairs." See id.
48. Id. The letter stated that the trip "raises questions," since it "[comes]
just three weeks after" the grant of certiorari in the case. See id.
49. Id. The letter concluded:
We would also like to know what mechanisms exist for
obtaining advisory opinions before activities are
undertaken and whether any such mechanism was utilized
by Justice Scalia before his recent trip with Vice President
Cheney. Further, we inquire whether mechanisms exist
for the Supreme Court to disqualify a Justice from
participating in a matter or for review of a Justice's
unilateral decision to decline to recuse himself.
Additionally, we would like to know whether the
Supreme Court has given any guidance to its Members
about the propriety of, and any conditions for, accepting
access to private jets for travel to extra-judicial activities.
You have often observed that the integrity and
independence of our federal courts is one of the crown
jewels of the American legal system. We agree. We
thank you for your prompt attention to this important
matter.
Id.
50. When Justice Rehnquist was nominated for Chief Justice in 1986, he
was widely criticized for not disqualifying himself in Laird. See Stempel, supra
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the Senators' letter quickly and simply: "there is no formal
procedure for Court review of the decision of a Justice in an
individual case. This is because it has long been settled that each
Justice must decide such a question for himself."'"
The Chief Justice characterized the Senators' suggestion
that Justice Scalia should recuse himself as "ill considered., 52 Thus,
the Chief Justice's view that a judge's personal opinion (rather than
considerations of public perception) should determine issues of
disqualification apparently remains intact.53
note 31, at 589-90, nn. 1-3.
51. Leahy & Lieberman Letter, supra note 46.
Apparently the Court has a quasi-policy that justices should err in favor
of not disqualifying themselves, recently demonstrated in Microsoft
Corporation v. United States. 530 U.S. 1301 (2000). Microsoft was represented
by Goodwin, Procter, and Hoar, the Boston firm at which the Chief Justice's
son, James C. Rehnquist, was a partner involved in the litigation. The Chief
Justice "decided that [he] should not disqualify himself from the[] cases"
because, among other reasons, the "negative impact that the unnecessary
disqualification of even one Justice may have upon our Court." Id. at 1303.
Justice Ginsburg cited a similar policy when she declined to disqualify
herself from a case involving the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Justice Ginsburg explained that "some of my colleagues think a recusal in the
Supreme Court is equivalent to a vote against the petitioner .... There is no
one to replace us. It makes it quite important that we not lightly recuse
ourselves." David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Ginsburg Stands By
Involvement With Group, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at A14. Justice Ginsburg
also detailed a formal agreement in which the four Justices who have spouses
or children who practice law have agreed not to step aside in cases simply
because of the relative's law firm's involvement. See id.
Very recently, Justice Breyer was criticized for not recusing himself in a
case involving the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines.
Justice Breyer had served as a lawyer for the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, which helped draft the guidelines, and as a member of the
Sentencing Commission from 1985 until 1989. Ultimately, and apparently
after seeking advice, Justice Breyer decided to hear the case, United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 543 U.S. - (2005), and authored the opinion of the
court in part on whether the guidelines could remain applicable as advisory
guidelines after the offending mandatory provisions were excised. See Tony
Mauro, Breyer Consulted Ethics Expert Over Sentencing Case Recusal, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 10.
52. Leahy & Lieberman Letter, supra note 46.
53. Legal scholars disagreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's view. In a
special editorial to the Los Angeles Times, Professors Lubet and Erwin
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A dismissive attitude toward the importance of public
perception and the appearance of impropriety was equally apparent
in Justice Scalia's response to the Motion to Recuse.5 Justice Scalia
quoted from the motion, which argued that
damage 'to the integrity of the system' is being
done right now .... Because the American
public, as reflected in the nation's newspaper
editorials, has unanimously concluded that
there is an appearance of favoritism, any
objective observer would be compelled to
conclude that Justice Scalia's impartiality has
been questioned."
In a fashion typical of Justice Scalia, he mocked the very
notion that the public's perception is of consequence." Discounting
any need to view the issue from any perspective other than his own,
Justice Scalia, as had then-Justice Rehnquist in Laird, simply
concluded that "[s]ince I do not believe my impartiality can
reasonably be questioned, I do not think it would be proper for me
to recuse.,
57
With these perspectives on judicial impartiality and the
Chemerinsky, commented that the Chief Justice "has committed the Supreme
Court to an each-justice-decides-alone position that places individual decision
beyond review .... Judicial disqualification is a serious matter for the U.S.
Supreme Court, which depends on public confidence for its legitimacy."
Erwin Chemerinsky & Steven Lubet, Commentary, In One Key Area, (the
Chief) Justice Is Indeed Blind, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004, at B15.
54. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct.
1391, 1399-1403 (2004).
55. Id. at 1399 (quoting Respondent's Motion for Recusal at 3-4, Cheney
v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 1391 (2004) (No. 03-
475)).
56. In his response, Justice Scalia wrote:
The implication of this argument is staggering. I must
recuse because a significant portion of the press, which is
deemed to be the American public, demands it .... Many
of them do not even have the facts right .... Such a blast
of largely inaccurate and uninformed opinion cannot
determine the recusal question.
Id. at 1399-1400.
57. Id. at 1401.
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public's perception of justice, the decision reached in White comes
as no surprise. If the only viewpoint that matters on judicial
impartiality is the judge's, no definition of impartiality is likely to
require judicial disqualification. Similarly, if the public's perception
of justice is devalued, and if its effect on the respect for and
continued viability of the justice system is discounted, then it will
not matter what candidates for judicial office say or do to acquire
the bench. In light of these perspectives, an analysis like that in
White, which boosts free speech above the integrity of the justice
system, is not unexpected.
III. BEFORE THERE WAS WHITE
From the inception of the Code of Judicial Conduct," those
who sought judicial office followed both a required 9 and time-
honored 6o tradition of not announcing their views on legal issues.
The premise behind the rule and the tradition was that judges, and
those who would hope to become judges, ought not prejudge cases.
They should instead base their decisions on the facts that they
heard, carefully presented in accordance with well-established rules
of evidence and procedure and in accordance with the law dictated
by the legislature or precedent established by other courts.
61
Announcing in advance a viewpoint on a legal issue was considered
5& See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). This
article uses the phrase "Code of Judicial Conduct" to refer to various versions
of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
59. Every state, through its supreme court, eventually adopted some
version of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 786 (2002) (discussing, indirectly, the state-by-state
adoptions of the Code).
60. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on this history to sustain
Minnesota's announce clause. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247
F.3d 854, 879-80 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd 536 U.S. 765 (2002). Justice Scalia
summarily rejected this notion based on his assertion that "[tjhe practice of
prohibiting speech by judicial candidates on disputed issues, however, is
neither long nor universal." White, 536 U.S. at 785.
61. For more on this point, see generally BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); R. Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfactions with the Administration of Justice, 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 23
(1956).
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inconsistent with the view of an impartial judiciary that based its
decisions on the rule of law, not personal opinions.
Formal judicial ethics rules had actually recognized the
limits on judicial speech in a number of ways. Some limitations
applied only during the election process. Thus, for example, some
states disallowed candidates from "announcing" their views; others
disallowed candidates from committing or appearing to commit
themselves with respect to issues and controversies; still others
forbade candidates from making pledges and promises.62
Regardless of the specifics of the prohibition, and some states
included all three prohibitions in their codes, the goal was the same:
to create an environment in which judges in actuality and in
appearance decided cases based on precedent and the evidence
presented in the courtroom, unaffected by political pressure or
special interests.
Similarly, judicial codes limited a candidate's "speech" in
seeking campaign contributions and political support. Even in
states in which judges were elected to the bench, rules prohibited
judges and candidates for judicial office from requesting
contributions and soliciting support, requiring instead that
63
committees be established to perform those functions.
In addition to these restrictions on fund-raising and support-
soliciting, many states also restricted other political activity by
judges and judicial candidates, including speeches and attendance
at political gatherings. These restrictions on judicial speech and
conduct were considered consistent with the general role of the
judge, summarized succinctly in the familiar oath of office taken by
those who become judges:
I, - - -, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
62. See supra notes 8, 10-11.
63. In some states, the prohibitions seemed to emphasize form over
substance. While the judge or candidate was prohibited from knowing who
contributed to the campaign and the amount of the contribution, the judge or
candidate was required to sign the campaign donation disclosure form, which
listed the donors and their donations. Cf. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10, Canon 7B (2)
(1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-105(h)(1)(A) (1994 Repl.). The Supreme
Court of Tennessee added commentary to Canon 7 that provided "[u]nless the
candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign contributors, their
names should not be revealed to the candidate." Id.
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will administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to
the rich, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties
incumbent upon me as - - - under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. So
help me God.64
Many state court judges take oaths of office that promise to
decide cases in accordance with the law "without respect to
persons" and with neither "fear nor favor."65
In addition to these speech and conduct limitations
applicable during campaigns, judicial codes also limited the speech
of judges once on the bench. Thus, for example, judges were
disallowed from commenting on a pending or impending case, from
making speeches on behalf of political candidates, from holding
political offices, from voluntarily appearing as a character witness,
and from lobbying, except on matters pertinent to the
administration of justice.
Like the restrictions on campaign speech and conduct, these
additional limitations were intended to ensure the role of the
judiciary as an independent, impartial branch of government,
outside and beyond the reach and control of the other branches and
the influence of partisan politics and special interests. The goal was
not only to secure a judiciary outside the political fray, but also to
instill in the public the requisite confidence and respect to assure
the continued viability of the system of justice.
Before these restrictions were challenged in the case that
ultimately reached the Supreme Court, concern brought about by
constitutional challenges in other courts prompted the American
Bar Association to review the 1972 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct.67 After laborious work,6' a revised code was adopted in
64. This oath of office, taken by federal judges and found in 28 U.S.C. §
453, is the model which most state court oaths follow.
65. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (requiring judges to discharge the
duties of their office "with fidelity"); TENN. CONST. art. 5, § 1.
66. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990).
67. The ABA had long-standing concerns about the constitutionality of
some of the campaign speech and conduct provisions of the Code of Judicial
2004]
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August 1990.69
Canon 5, which concerned the political activity of judges,
was substantially revised, removing the announce clause at issue in
White and retaining a prohibition against making pledges and
promises of conduct in office. In place of the announce clause, the
1990 Model Code contained a new prohibition against making
"statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court. ,70
IV. AND THEN THERE WAS WHITE
Against this backdrop, the United States Supreme Court
was given the opportunity to speak broadly on the constitutionality
of restrictions on speech and conduct in judicial campaigns in
White. If a silver lining exists in the Court's decision, it is found in
the Court's selectivity of issues.
• .71
The petition for certiorari filed with the Court in White
raised three issues,72 all based on provisions of the Minnesota Code
Conduct. Based upon a 1986 survey of "authorities in the fields of judicial
ethics," a comprehensive review of the 1972 Code was undertaken. MILORD,
supra note 6, at 3.
68. The work is described as including consultation with state judicial
conduct organizations, the ABA Judicial Administration Division, the
American Judicature Society, and other groups and organizations, review of
state judicial conduct literature and opinions, and submission of nearly 5,000
copies of a discussion draft. Id.
69. Canon 5 was substantially revised, purportedly to put it "more in line
with constitutional guarantees of free speech, while preventing the harm that
can come from statements damaging the appearance of judicial integrity and
impartiality." Id. at 50.
70. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990).
The Committee originally proposed a prohibition against "stat[ing] personal
views on issues that may come before the court," but replaced that version
with the "commitment" prohibition. MILORD, supra note 6, at 99.
71. Petition for Certiorari, Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534 U.S.
1054 (No. 01-521).
72. The issues raised in the petition for certiorari were:
1. Whether the provision of the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct that prohibits a candidate for elective
judicial office from "announc[ing] his or her views on
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of Judicial Conduct. 73  The petition challenged on First and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds provisions of the Code that
restricted speech and conduct during judicial campaigns. Included
in the petition for certiorari were challenges to the Minnesota
Code's prohibitions on attendance at political gatherings, party
identifications, party endorsements, and solicitation of campaign
contributions. 74
disputed legal or political issues" unconstitutionally
impinges on the freedom of speech as guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
2. Whether the severe burdens imposed by various
provisions of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct
unconstitutionally impinge on the right of political parties
to endorse candidates for elective judicial office in
violation of the freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and equal protection of law as guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
3. Whether the provision of the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct that forbids a candidate for elective
judicial office from attending or speaking at any political
party gathering - while permitting such a candidate to
attend or speak at gatherings of all other organizations -
unconstitutionally impinges on the freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and equal protection of the law as
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
Id. at i.
73. Judges in Minnesota have been subject to ethical codes since at least
1950. Originally, the Minnesota judges adopted the 1924 version of the ABA
Canons of Judicial Ethics, but, in 1974, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
a more modern version based largely on the ABA's 1972 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. While that Code has likewise been altered by the
Minnesota Supreme Court on numerous occasions, the provision regulating a
candidate's announcement of his or her views remained as written in the 1972
ABA Code. An advisory committee appointed to study the 1990 Model Code
of Judicial Conduct and make recommendations to the Minnesota Supreme
Court recommended that Minnesota adopt the later version, but the court
declined to do so. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 786-
87 (2002).
74. Petition for Certiorari at i, Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534
U.S. 1054 (No. 01-521).
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The Court granted certiorari solely on the first issue listed in
the Petition for Certiorari. As stated in the petition, the issue was:
Whether the provision of the Minnesota Code
of Judicial Conduct that prohibits a candidate
for elective judicial office from "announc[ing]
his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues" unconstitutionally impinges on the
freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.75
Ultimately, a five justice majority answered the question
affirmatively, striking down the announce clause in an opinion
76
which, on the surface, had limited implications.
In fact, Justice Scalia described the issue quite narrowly in
the opening sentence of the majority opinion as "whether the First
Amendment permits the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit
candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their
views on disputed legal and political issues." 7  Finding that the
provision was not narrowly tailored to meet any compelling state
interest, the Court concluded that the announce clause violated the
First Amendment. Justice Scalia specifically confined the ruling to
the announce clause,78 noting that provisions regulating judicial
75. Id. at i. Thus, as framed, the decision may seem to apply only in the
thirty-nine states in which judges are selected by the voters, but see infra notes
169-75 and accompanying text.
76. Since the clause had been repudiated by the ABA in their 1990
revision and remained in effect in only a few states, the impact of the decision,
on its face, appeared slight.
77. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
78. Although Justice Scalia's opinion emphasized that the decision did
not affect the pledges and promises provision, Justice Kennedy, a concurring
member of the majority, seemed to forecast his view that such a provision
would likewise fail First Amendment scrutiny. Justice Kennedy, in his short
concurring opinion, noted that:
I adhere to my view, however, that content-based speech
restrictions that do not fall within any traditional
exception should be invalidated without inquiry into
narrow tailoring or compelling government interests. The
speech at issue here does not come within any of the
exceptions to the First Amendment recognized by the
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promises, pledges, or commitments, in effect in the majority of the
state's judicial codes, were neither at issue, nor ruled upon.79
Court. "Here, a law is directed to speech alone where the
speech in question is not obscene, not defamatory, not
words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, not an
impairment of some other constitutional right, not an
incitement to lawless action, and not calculated or likely
to bring about imminent harm the State has the
substantive power to prevent. No further inquiry is
necessary to reject the State's argument that the statute
should be upheld." The political speech of candidates is
at the heart of the First Amendment, and direct
restrictions on the content of candidate speech are simply
beyond the power of government to impose.
Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Simon & Schuster Inc. v. N.Y.
State Crime Victims' Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring))
(internal citations omitted).
This viewpoint alarmed the dissent. Justice Stevens noted that:
Justice Kennedy would go even further and hold that no
content-based restriction of a judicial candidate's speech
is permitted under the First Amendment. While he does
not say so explicitly, this extreme position would preclude
even Minnesota's prohibition against "pledges or
promises" by a candidate for judicial office .... The
unwisdom of this proposal illustrates why the same
standards should not apply to speech in campaigns for
judicial and legislative office.
Id. at 802 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Arguably, Justice Stevens overstates Justice Kennedy's position. Justice
Kennedy seems to endorse the proposition that states may impose restrictions
on judges as judges, but not as judicial candidates. He says: "[e]xplicit
standards of judicial conduct provide essential guidance for judges in the
proper discharge of their duties and the honorable conduct of their office...
[y]et these standards may not be used by the State to abridge the speech of
aspiring judges in a judicial campaign." Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
But see infra notes 203-04, 207-08 and accompanying text.
79. Justice Scalia limited the scope of the opinion by stating:
[T]he Minnesota Code contains a so-called "pledges or
promises" clause, which separately prohibits judicial
candidates from making "pledges or promises of conduct
in office other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of office," - a prohibition that is not
challenged here and on which we express no view.
Id. at 770 (internal citations omitted).
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Additionally, the majority carefully demarcated what it was not
holding. Although the First Amendment gave judges the right to
announce their legal and political views during campaigns, they
were not "compelled" to do so.80
V. AND, STILL THERE IS WHITE
Even if White's holding appeared narrow on its face, directly
affecting only a few states, the flurry of activity that followed
evidenced immediate confusion8 and eventual alarm.n As is often
80. In further clarifying the scope of the opinion Justice Scalia stated:
Nor do we assert that candidates for judicial office should
be compelled to announce their views on disputed legal
issues. Thus, Justice Ginsburg's repeated invocation of
instances in which nominees to this Court declined to
announce such views during Senate confirmation hearings
is pointless. That the practice of voluntarily demurring
does not establish the legitimacy of legal compulsion to
demur is amply demonstrated by the unredacted text of
the sentence she quotes in part from Laird v. Tatum.
Id. at 783-84 n.11 (internal citation omitted).
81. Some of the confusion was the result of the separate concurring
opinions, written by two justices who were essential to the majority. Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, seemed anguished with the result. She
indicated that her separate concurrence was motivated by her "concerns about
judicial elections generally." Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Were one
to read only the first five of her seven paragraphs, and then attempt to
speculate whether she was joining the majority or the dissent, it would surely
be the latter. But, she concludes, as follows:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through
contested popular elections instead of through an
appointment system or a combined appointment and
retention election system .... In doing so the State has
voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias described
above .... If the state has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself
by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.
Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
On this point, which may be described as "you get what you asked for,"
Justice Kennedy took issue:
[W]e should refrain from criticism of the State's choice to
use open elections to select those persons most likely to
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the case, the decision raised as many questions as it answered.
States and special interest groups began to search for answers to
these questions on their own.
Some states seemed anxious to disavow provisions of their
codes that even remotely resembled that at issue in White. The
California Commission on Judicial Performance, for example,
dismissed charges filed against a judge based on campaign materials
that arguably did little to announce the judge's views."' Instead, the
materials criticized the conduct of the judge's opponent, a public
defender, in defending his clients in the court in which the judge
presided. Notwithstanding an acknowledgment that California had
no announce clause, the California Supreme Court amended its
judicial code in response to White, citing a fear of
achieve judicial excellence. States are free to choose this
mechanism .... By condemning judicial elections across
the board, we implicitly condemn countless elected state
judges and without warrant.
Id. at 795-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion of the confusion in
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, see infra notes 203-04, 207-08 and
accompanying text.
82. The decision was released on June 27, 2002. Many states had judicial
elections scheduled during the fall of 2002. Thirty-three states were holding
Supreme Court elections that fall. Candidates for office and judicial conduct
commissions were forced to react quickly. See infra notes 149-75 and
accompanying text.
83. Patricia Gray, No. 159 (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance Aug.
27, 2002). In campaign literature, Judge Gray, the California Supreme Court
incumbent, described herself as a "Tough Judge Who Makes Criminal
Lawyers Unhappy." Hearing Set for Ex-Judge Charged with Ethics Violations,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 17,2001, at 1. She also stated in the
mailer that her opponent "Cares About the Rights of Violent Criminals"
while she "Cares About the Rights of Crime Victims." Id.
The opponent, and winner of the race, Elliot Daum, was a deputy public
defender. He filed the complaint against Gray after defeating her in the
election. Among the campaign materials about which Daum complained
about was one entitled "Cop Killer," which stated that Daum had "demanded
that all charges against the cop killer be dropped." Id. The mailer also
detailed other cases involving Daum's clients for whom Gray imposed
maximum sentences. Id. The race between Daum and Gray was described by
one local newspaper as the "bitterest and most expensive Sonoma judicial
campaign in memory" with the two candidates spending more than $280,000.
Id.
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overinclusiveness. 84
Some states, like California, amended their codes, while
others issued orders indicating that certain provisions would not be
enforced. 85  The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, for example,
contained a provision that was similar to the announce clause, but
that seemed, at least on its face, more defensible. It provided that
judges or judicial candidates
shall not make statements that indicate an
opinion on any issue that may be subject to
judicial interpretation by the office which is
being sought or held, except that discussion of
an individual's judicial philosophy is
appropriate if conducted in a manner which
does not suggest to a reasonable person a
• 86
probable decision on any particular case.
The provision was challenged, however, in a suit brought by
a candidate for the Texas Supreme Court.8 Because of the
84. California Advisory Commission Comments Canon 5(B)(1) (added
"appears to commit"); id. Canon 5(B)(2) (added "or with reckless disregard
for the truth"). For a discussion of the rule, see Cornell Legal Info. Inst.,
California Legal Ethics, Judicial and Legal Officials, at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/ca/narr/CANARR_8.HTM (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
85. The Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, issued an order on July
18, 2002, that Canon 5.B.(1)(c), Missouri's announce clause, "shall not be
enforced against candidates for judicial office that is filled (1) by public
election between competing candidates; or (2) by candidates appointed to or
retained in office.., but only when their candidacy has drawn active
opposition." In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B.(1)(c) (Mo., July 18,
2002), available at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/sup/index.nsf/d45a7635d4bfdb8f8625662000632638/f
lc626db4da8b14086256bfa0073b302?OpenDocument.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court deleted the "announce clause" and
substituted a "commit clause" in its judicial code. See Am. Judicature Society,
Judicial Selection in the States, Pennsylvania: Judicial Campaigns and
Elections, at http://www.ajs.org/js/PAelections.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005)
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review). Texas struck a provision
that was similar to, but distinguishable from, the announce clause following
court action. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
86. See TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcT Canon 5(1) (1994).
87. The plaintiff, described at the time as Austin solo practitioner Steven
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pendency of White in the Supreme Court, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas had issued a stay.8 After
White was decided the court concluded, literally without discussion,
the following: "this Court finds no distinction between [the
Wayne Smith, became Associate Justice Steven Wayne Smith. Smith was no
newcomer to the courts. In the early 1990s, Smith sued the University of
Texas Law School on behalf of white applicants and won a decision in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals striking down racial preferences. Hopwood v.
Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). The conservative theme resonated in his
campaign, and at least, initially, fell outside the parameters of approved
judicial speech. Smith originally campaigned on the platform that he was a
"conservative," but, according to news sources, beginning in September (one
month after the district court found the ethics rule to be unconstitutional),
"Smith trumpeted his role in the Hopwood decision." Beth Henary, On the
Right Side of the Law, THE DAILY STANDARD, at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/OO1/ 6 9 2 xnozx.
asp?pg=l (Sept. 23, 2002).
Smith first defeated incumbent Xavier Rodriquez in the Republican
primary, despite the vast differences in campaign spending. Rodriguez, who
labeled himself a "moderate" reportedly spent over $550,000, while Smith
spent less than $10,000. Id. Another source asserted an even greater
difference in expenditures, placing Rodriguez at $700,000 and Smith at $8,000.
Max B. Baker, Justice on Supreme Court Faces Primary Challenge, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 31, 2003, at 3B. In the general election, Smith
faced a state appeals judge, Margaret Mirabal, who had gained the
endorsement of many groups that often endorse Republicans, including the
Texans for Lawsuit Reform. Henary, supra.
Smith's views were clear to the voters. One local Republican Party
member summarized Smith's candidacy: "I will vote for him come
November.... The majority of Republicans are against affirmative action ....
We should be comfortable with someone who holds that position." Smith
does not deny being against racial preferences, but describes his position as
follows: "If you're going to take a stand [against] racial preferences, you've got
a special responsibility to ensure that our laws on equal opportunity are
enforced. You can't be against racial preferences unless you make sure that
the race, age, and sex discrimination that does exist is prosecuted." Id.
Smith won the general election and became an Associate Justice in 2002.
Smith was then defeated by Paul Green in the March 2004 primary; Green was
unopposed in the November general election and was accordingly elected to
that post. See Texas Secretary of State, Statewide Elected Officials, at
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/elected.shtml (last visited Feb. 17,
2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
88. Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A-A-02CV111JRN, 2002 WL 1870038, at
*1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2002).
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announce clause in Minnesota] and Texas' Code of Judicial
Conduct 5(1) .... [The provision] violates the First Amendment." 9
Other states were required to determine how the decision in
White affected other provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
One such case gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to weigh in
with further guidance on the issue of judicial campaign speech, this
time on a pledges and promises provision.9° The case involved aFlorida County Judge, 91 against whom the Florida Supreme Court
89. Id. at *1.
90. The White decision was issued on June 27, 2002. The petition for
certiorari in Inquiry Concerning Judge Kinsey was denied on October 6, 2003.
In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003).
91. Judge Patricia Kinsey was charged with twelve ethical violations
arising out of her 1998 campaign for County Judge in Escambia County. Each
of the charges are recited, along with the recommendation made by the
Judicial Qualifications Commission, in the Florida Supreme Court's opinion.
Id. at 80. In summary, the charges, which were primarily proved by the
introduction of campaign brochures and radio excerpts, alleged that Kinsey
either promised or pledged certain conduct or made statements suggesting a
commitment to certain rulings. Id.
Kinsey's campaign was a traditional "law and order" campaign. Her
campaign materials included a full-page picture of her with ten uniformed,
armed police officers, in which she asked, "Who do these guys count on to
back them up?" Id. at 87. She asserted, for example, that she was "[t]he
unanimous choice of law enforcement"; that "police officers expect judges to
take their testimony seriously and to help law enforcement by putting
criminals where they belong.., behind bars"; that criminals probably would
not want to read her campaign literature; that judges must support "hard-
working law enforcement officers by putting criminals behind bars"; that she
would "bend over backward to ensure that honest, law-abiding citizens are not
victimized a second time by the legal system that is supposed to protect them";
and that she "above all else [I identifies with the victims of crime." Id. at 80-
82. Kinsey characterized her opponent as a "liberal," noting that the judge, a
former criminal defense lawyer, was "still in that defense mode" and
characterized an accused as a "thug." Id. at 82-83. Kinsey misrepresented
facts about judicial hearings, and claimed that her opponent failed to revoke
bond in a case, thereby showing "a shocking lack of compassion for the victims
of violent crime," and used the nickname "Let 'em Go Green" for her
opponent, an incumbent judge. Id. at 82-84. Kinsey described her
responsibility as a judge as to be "absolutely a reflection of what the
community wants." Id. at 89. She was ultimately found guilty or partially
guilty of nine ethical violations. In defense of her conduct, Kinsey argued that
her campaign conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 85.
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had upheld a public reprimand and a $50,000 fine9 for numerous
violations of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, 93 including the
prohibitions against making pledges, promises, and commitments.
The judge acknowledged that some of her campaign conduct and
speech violated the letter of Florida's ethics provisions,94 including
the pledges and promises 95 and commitment 96 provisions, but urged
the Florida justices to find that enforcement of those provisions
92. Id. at 90. One justice concurred in part and dissented in part,
expressing his opinion that the "only rational conclusion would be the removal
of Judge Kinsey from the position secured through inappropriate pledges and
promises .. " Id. at 99 (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. In addition to the pledges and promises and commitment provisions,
Kinsey was charged with violating a part of Canon 3 referred to as the
"comment clause," which prohibits a judge "while a proceeding is pending or
impending in any court from mak[ing] any public comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any
nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or
hearing." FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3B(9) (2003). The court,
however, found that Canon 3B(9) was not applicable and instead reviewed the
claim in light of Canon 7A(d)(3)(ii), the commitment clause. Finding
insufficient evidence of a violation, the Florida Supreme Court referred the
matter to the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee for study expressing
"concern[] as to whether it is appropriate for a judicial candidate to make
public comments on pending cases where such comments could affect their
future outcomes .... ." Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 91. One opinion states that
judges running for office may not use the words "prosecutor" or "state
attorney" in campaign literature. Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee,
In re: Report of the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Regarding Judicial
Conduct, at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalPractice/opinions/judicialethicsadvisoryopinions/200
2/2002-12.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment
Law Review).
94. Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 88.
95. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(3)(d)(i) (2003). This
Florida ethics rule prohibits a candidate for judicial office from "mak[ing]
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office." Id. This is the same provision raised,
but not addressed by the United States Supreme Court in White. See
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
96. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(3)(d)(ii) (2003). This
Florida ethics rule provides that a candidate for judicial office "shall not...
make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect
to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." Id.
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violated the First Amendment.9
The Florida Supreme Court refused to extend White to
invalidate the promises and pledges provision. Although two of
the Florida justices dissented based on White,99 and a third found
that most of the judge's statements were "announc[ements of]
position," not pledges or promises, '0 a majority of the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the pledges and promises provision in spite
of the constitutional attack.'0 '
97. Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 85.
98. Id. at 89.
99. Id. at 100 (Wells, J., dissenting). Two other justices mentioned White.
Justice Lewis noted that White did not dispose of the issue since the Florida
case involved the pledges and promises provision. Id. at 99 (Lewis, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Pariente, perhaps
unintentionally, credited White with having declared the pledges and promises
provision unconstitutional, writing that:
Indeed, since our Code was amended in 1994 to remove
the 'pledge and promise' clause - the very clause found to
be unconstitutional in [White] - hundreds of candidates
campaigning for judgeships have successfully balanced the
competing interests inherent in judicial elections without
making statements that impugn their impartiality, cater to
a particular group, or make misrepresentations as to their
opponents' qualifications and track records.
Id. at 94 (Pariente, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 100 (Wells, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 92. Florida has remained consistent, if not clear, in its
approach. In Kinsey, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the restraints are narrowly tailored to protect the state's
compelling interests [in preserving the integrity of the
judiciary and maintaining the public's confidence in an
impartial judiciary] without unnecessarily prohibiting
protected speech. As is clear from the canons and related
commentary, a candidate may state his or her personal
views, even on disputed issues.
Id. at 87. The Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee has
concluded that a candidate "may respond to an opinion survey so long as the
candidate follows the mandate of Canon 7," Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory
Comm. Op. 2004-24 (2004); that a "candidate may state his views orally or in
writing on disputed issues, as long as the candidate also states that the
candidate will uphold the law," Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 2004-
09 (2004); and that a "candidate may state his or her views on... controversial
issues," but "should emphasize in any public statement the candidate's duty to
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Kinsey petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari, asserting that the pledges and promises provision and the
commitment provision of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct
violated the First Amendment.' °2 The petition for certiorari gave
the Court an opportunity to determine the parameters on judicial
speech restrictions in effect in most states. The Court, however,
denied certiorari without dissent or opinion03
uphold the law regardless of his or her personal views." Fla. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm. Op. 2002-13 (2002).
102. The petition recited that "Canon 7A(3) of the Florida Code of
Judicial Conduct, as interpreted and applied by the Florida Supreme Court, is
an unconstitutional restriction of a judicial candidate's speech and directly
conflicts with the First Amendment and [White]" and "create[s] the 'state-
imposed voter ignorance' condemned by [White]." Petition for Certiorari at
*6, Kinsey v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003)
(No. 02-1855), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003). That Canon in Florida
contains both the pledges and promises provision, which the Florida Supreme
Court upheld, and the commitment provision, which arguably, the Florida
court did not specifically address. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7A(3) (2003). In any event, because Kinsey had been disciplined for violating
both, and because her petition for certiorari included both, the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to address the application of the First Amendment to
these provisions.
103. Kinsey v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 540 U.S. 825 (2003).
The Nevada Supreme Court latched onto the denial of certiorari as a means of
assuring its citizens of the integrity of the state judiciary. In a press release,
Chief Justice Miriam Shearing stated that the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized in a Florida case that a
state may establish limits on judicial campaign speech.
The [C]ourt refused to review the case in which a judge
was fined $50,000 by the Florida Supreme Court for
inappropriate campaign rhetoric .... The U.S. Supreme
Court let stand the fine and the determination that the
judge had stepped over the ethical line.
Press Release, Nevada Supreme Court, Chief Justice Miriam Shearing
Clarifies Supreme Court Position on Judicial Campaign Speech, at
http://nvsupremecourt.us/press/press-040707_campaignSpeech.html (July 7,
2004). Therefore, Justice Shearing continued, "[c]itizens of Nevada are
entitled to feel comfortable that their judges will be fair and impartial and
have not made prior commitments to decide cases in particular ways even
before hearing the evidence and arguments." Id. But, in Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950), the Court, opining on denial
of certiorari, wrote:
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Like Florida, the highest court of New York declined to
extend White, sustaining its pledges and promises clause despite a
First Amendment challenge. In In re Watson,1'0 the New York
Court of Appeals concluded that a candidate's campaign
statements05 "articulated a pledge or promise of future conduct...
that compromises the faithful and impartial performance of judicial
duties."1°6 Review in the Supreme Court was not sought.
What is similar about the two cases - and in stark contrast
to White - is the contextual analysis undertaken by both state
courts. In both the New York and Florida cases, judges were
disciplined for campaign conduct and speech in violation of state
ethics rules. Both judges defended their actions by claiming that
the discipline violated their First Amendment rights. Conversely,
the candidate in White raised the First Amendment issue in a
lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a
writ of certiorari means is that fewer than four members
of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has
rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no
implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the
merits of a case which it has declined to review. The
Court has said this again and again; again and again the
admonition has to be repeated.
Id. at 919.
104. 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003).
105. Judge Watson locked onto the "law and order" platform as a means
for securing votes. Watson wrote a letter to law enforcement personnel asking
for their votes in order to "put a real prosecutor on the bench." Id. at 2.
Watson also stated in the letter that the city needed a judge who would "work
with the police, not against them [and who will] assist our law enforcement
officers as they aggressively work towards cleaning up our city streets." Id.
Watson also wrote letters to the editors of a local newspaper commending his
work as a prosecutor and asking voters to elect him so that the city could send
a similar message, presumably by his presence on the bench. Id. at 2-3. His
newspaper ads focused on his "proven experience in the war against crime."
Id. at 3. He also insinuated that the incumbent judges were responsible for
soaring arrests in the local communities. Id. After the complaints were filed,
the judge admitted that his comments had violated the ethics rules and
apologized. Id. Nonetheless, the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct
recommended his removal from office. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 4-5.
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enforcement of the ethics provisions. His proposed speech and
conduct were abstract, and absent context. The absence of context
attributed to the majority's purely academic and functional analysis.
Arguably, it also prompted a greater reliance on preconceived
notions.
The restrictive reading of White employed by the Florida
and New York courts did not prove persuasive to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. Rather than follow the state courts'
narrow interpretation of White, the Eleventh Circuit extended the
White rationale to invalidate parts of the Georgia Code of Judicial
Conduct in effect in many other states.
George Weaver, a Georgia lawyer, mounted a campaign
against Justice Leah Sears for a seat on the Georgia Supreme
Court. °7 In his campaign materials, Weaver claimed that Justice
Sears "stood for" same sex marriage, questioned laws that
prohibited sex with children under fourteen, and referred to the
electric chair as "silly."' ' As a result of these and other comments,
ethics complaints were filed and ultimately resolved against Weaver
by the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission.1 0 Weaver sued
claiming that the Georgia judicial canon's "false statement clause,"
which prohibited judicial candidates from making statements that
the candidate "knows or reasonably should know [to be] false"" °
violated the First Amendment."
107. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2002).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1315 (quoting GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon
7(B)(1)(d) (1998)).The entire provision of the canon at issue in Weaver forbids
public communication:
which the candidate knows or reasonably should know is
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains
a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact
necessary to make the communication considered as a
whole not materially misleading or which is likely to
create an unjustified expectation about results the
candidate can achieve.
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d) (1998).
111. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319. Weaver's lawsuit challenged the judicial
canons that prohibited "false, fraudulent, misleading, [or] deceptive"
communications by candidates as well as communication which contains "a
2004]
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The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Weaver. In order to pass
constitutional muster, the court held that the prohibited statements
"must be limited to false statements that are made with knowledge
of falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether the statement is
false."112
This part of the Weaver decision was of minimal
consequence because the false statement clause, like the announce
clause, was not widely included in state judicial ethics codes.113 Of
great consequence, however, is the remainder of the Eleventh
Circuit's decision, which has been described as demonstrating "how
reckless a federal court can be., 114 Despite the fact that neither
Weaver nor his opponent had challenged, argued, or briefed it, the
court invalidated an ethics rule, 5 in effect in thirty-five states, that
prohibited candidates for judicial office from "themselves
solicit[ing] campaign funds or... publicly stated support... 6 The
material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the
communication considered as a whole not materially misleading or which is
likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can
achieve." GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d) (1998). In
addition, Weaver challenged Canon 7(B)(2), which prohibited judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds or publicly stated
support, requiring instead that the candidate establish an election committee
which may undertake such solicitation on behalf of the candidate. Weaver,
309 F.3d at 1322.
112. Id. at 1319.
113. At one time, Alabama and Michigan had similar ethics provisions.
While an appeal was pending in the Eleventh Circuit on the constitutionality
of the Alabama provision, the Alabama Supreme Court amended the
provision to prohibit only knowing or reckless false statements. Butler v. Ala.
Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207, 218 (Ala. 2001). See also In re
Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000) (striking down similar provision).
114. Howard A. Levine & Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Campaign Rules,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 13, 2003, at 2. The Eleventh Circuit opinion does not discuss
why the issue was decided by the court, but Schotland and Levine state that
the provision "had not been challenged by plaintiff, nor argued nor briefed at
trial or on appeal. Id.
115. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23 (finding Canon 7(B)(2) of the Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct unconstitutional).
116. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (2004). The
parallel provision of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, found in
Canon 5(C)(2), provides that a "candidate shall not personally solicit or accept
campaign contributions or personally solicit publicly state support. A
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court concluded, with sparse citation to authority,"7 that the
provision "completely chilled [candidates] from speaking to
potential contributors and endorsers about their potential
contributions and endorsements.
1 1 8
In reaching its conclusion on the false statement provision,
the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly attributed to the White majority
this conclusion: "the standard for judicial elections should be the
same as the standard for legislative and executive elections."" 9 In
support of this attribution, the Eleventh Circuit quoted Justice
Scalia, who commented that the differences between judicial and
legislative elections had been "'greatly exaggerate[d],"" 2  but
ignored Justice O'Connor, the necessary fifth vote for the majority,
candidate may, however, establish committees of responsible persons to
conduct campaigns for the candidate .... Such committee may solicit and
accept reasonable campaign contributions... and obtain public statements of
support for his or her candidacy." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr
Canon 5(C)(2) (1990).
117. The court cited only Justice O'Connor's concurrence in White. See
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322 (citing White, 536 U.S. at 789-90 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). The rationale was similar in the style, but not the content, of
Justice O'Connor's concurrence. While Justice O'Connor lamented the fact
that elected judges may feel beholden to their financial supporters, White, 536
U.S. at 789-90, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]he impartiality concerns, if
any, are created by the State's decision to elect judges publicly," Weaver, 309
F.3d at 1322.
The Eleventh Circuit did not appear moved by the decisions on similar
provisions reached by the District Court for Minnesota, see Republican Party
of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 983 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that the
Codes are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest of
preventing undue influence or the appearance thereof), or the Eighth Circuit,
see Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 876 (8th Cir. 2001)
(upholding the restrictions placed on judicial candidates' partisan activities).
Nor did the Supreme Court's decision not to grant certiorari on similar
provisions seem to affect their decision. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly,
534 U.S. 1054, 1054 (2001). The Court limited the grant of certiorari to
"Question 1 presented by the petition." Id. Question One of the petition dealt
with the "'announce' clause," while Question Two dealt with "'endorsement'
clauses," and Question Three with " 'attend and speak' clauses." Petition for
Certiorari at i, 3, Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (No. 01-521).
118. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322.
119. Id. at 1321.
120. Id. (quoting White, 536 U.S. at 874).
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who wrote separately to express her concern about judicial
121
elections. Such an expansive reading of the White rationale,
particularly in light of the reservations expressed in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, is ill advised.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision was issued some four
months after White. A request for rehearing en banc was denied
122
and neither party sought certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. Nonetheless, the appellate court's willingness to extend
White, even without request, was apparently sufficient impetus to
prompt another federal court to follow suit. In Spargo v. New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 12 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York enjoined the• • 125
enforcement of certain provisions of the New York Code of
121. See White, 536 U.S. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002), reh'g denied
Weaver v. Bonner, No. 00-15188-DD, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 464 *1 (11th Cir.
Jan. 9, 2003). Thus, three judges, sitting as the panel that decided Weaver, two
from the Eleventh Circuit, and one visiting from the Fifth, without the benefit
of advocacy of counsel invalidated ethics provisions in effect in numerous
states.
123. 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
124. Demonstrating perhaps the strength of his conviction that the
provisions were unconstitutional, the same district judge refused to stay his
ruling pending appeal. Judge David Hurd wrote that "[w]hile confusion and
delay in misconduct proceedings may be a temporary result of this injunction,
it cannot be said that it is in the public interest to allow the commission to
violate a judge's.., core First Amendment rights." Spargo v. N.Y. State
Comm'n of Judicial Conduct, No. 1:02-CV-1320, 2003 WL 2002762, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29,2003) (denying stay).
125. The relevant New York ethics rules provided:
[Neither a judge nor a candidate for judicial office] shall
directly or indirectly engage in any political activity•...
includ[ing]:
(c) engaging in any partisan political activity [except
for participation in the judge's own campaign];
(d) participating in any political campaign for any
office or permitting his or her name to be used in
connection with any activity of a political organization;
(e) publicly endorsing or publicly opposing (other than
by running against) any other candidate for public
office;
[Vol. 3
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Judicial Conduct prohibiting judges and candidates for judicial
office from participating in political activityl 26 while state
disciplinary proceedings were pending against the plaintiff.12
128Amidst varying predictions, the Second Circuit vacated the
(f) making speeches on behalf of a political
organization or another candidate;
(g) attending political gatherings;
A judge.., shall maintain the dignity appropriate to
judicial office and act in a manner consistent with the
integrity and independence of the judiciary ....
Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 81-82 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit.
22, § 100.5 (2003)).
126. Id. at 92. The court held that the prohibitions were impermissible
prior restraints on a judicial candidate's free speech rights. The court
described the provisions as:
even broader than prohibiting specific speech, such as
views on legal or political issues as in White. [H]ere judges
and judicial candidates are essentially precluded from
participating in politics at all except to participate in their
own election campaigns. Moreover, a wholesale
prohibition on participating in political activity for fear of
influencing a judge ignores the fact that a judicial
candidate must have at one time participated in politics or
would not find him or herself in the position of a
candidate.
Id. at 88.
127. The case actually involved three plaintiffs. Spargo was a Town
Justice and a candidate for judicial office charged with violation of the ethics
rules. Because of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him,
the defendants argued that the district court should abstain from jurisdiction
under the Younger doctrine since the "state disciplinary proceeding provide[d]
Spargo with a fully adequate forum to raise his constitutional challenges."
Spargo v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004) (mem.) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44-45 (1971), for the proposition that "federal courts should generally
refrain from enjoining pending state court proceedings"). The remaining two
plaintiffs, McNally and Kermani, sued, however, as voters or party office
holders, and were not the subject of disciplinary complaints. The defendants'
position was that the principles of federalism and comity nonetheless required
abstention from their cases as well.
128. Tom Perrotta, of the New York Law Journal, described the panel as
"skeptical" during oral argument, noting that one judge was "not necessarily
impressed with the substance of the judge's arguments." Tom Perrotta,
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judgment and remanded the case, with an instruction that the
district court abstain from taking jurisdiction. 9 The petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied without
opinion.
1 30
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The missed, or avoided, opportunities to revisit White are
Spargo's Challenge Meets Stiff Resistance From Second Circuit Panel, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 30, 2003, at 1. Another observer, however, described the oral argument
as a "dispassionate, scholarly discussion... [about] a hotly emerging area of
federal constitutional law." Bernard Malone, Jr., Spargo Oral Argument:
Another Point of View, N.Y. L.J. Oct. 1, 2003, at 2.
129. Spargo, 351 F.3d at 85-86. New York officials had urged the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York to abstain on the
basis of "'a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with
pending judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances."' Spargo,
244 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)). The district court declined to
abstain for two reasons. First, the court expressed concerns as to whether
Spargo could seek mandatory review over the decision of the Commission in
the New York Court of Appeals. Second, the court noted that neither of the
other two plaintiffs were parties to Spargo's disciplinary action. Id. at 82- 85.
Because the New York Court of Appeals, subsequent to the district court
decision, confirmed that it conducted a mandatory review of the Commission's
disciplinary decisions, see In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (per
curiam); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam), and because the
claims of the other two plaintiffs were intertwined with Spargo's, the Second
Circuit found that abstention was required.
Apparently, retired New York Court of Appeals Judge Howard Levine
agreed with the decision. He noted, just months before it was issued, that:
"State Supreme Courts work hard at writing and enforcing rules that balance
judicial independence with accountability. When such an effort is attacked as
unconstitutional, the federal courts owe the states at least decent respect."
Levine & Schotland, supra note 114, at 2.
130. Spargo v. New York Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 124 S. Ct. 2812,
2812 (2004) (mem.).
131. At least one other decision since White, this one rendered by a state
supreme court, has dealt with First Amendment challenges to judicial ethics
rules. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld provisions that disallowed
sitting judges from soliciting support for political candidates and organizations
and from purchasing tickets to political functions. In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d
338 (Me. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1722 (2004) (mem.). The court found
that the provision was "narrowly tailored to serve [the] compelling state
interest ... in preserving the appearance of, and the impartiality, of the state
judiciary." Id. at 350-51. The court further found that the prohibition "applies
only to conduct which presents the greatest risk to that interest." Id. at 351.
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not at an end, and will not be for some time. Since the Court
granted certiorari on only one of several issues presented in White,
the lawsuit was remanded for further action to the Eighth Circuit.
In March 2004, the Eighth Circuit, in a two-one decision, remanded
the case to the district court with specific instructions."' First,
because of the reversal of its decision on the announce clause, that
part of the case was remanded for the district court to enter
judgment for the plaintiff.34 Similarly, since neither side had
appealed the original decision upholding the restrictions on
campaign fund solicitations, a provision invalidated in Weaver, that
part of the case was remanded for entry of judgment for the
defendant. "5 Lastly, the court remanded the challenges to the ban
on political activities to the district court for a decision on whether
its prior disposition was consistent with the Supreme Court's
136decision. When this order was challenged, the court granted a
petition for rehearing en banc and scheduled oral argument.13
Some courts and judicial conduct commissions are filling the
vacuum left by White with inconsistent and sometimes poorly
reasoned decisions. Thus, some say a rush to study, amend, delete,
and revise codes of judicial conduct throughout the country has
occurred. While deleting or declining to enforce announce clauses
is constitutionally required, and thus understandable, far more than
the thirteen states that have announce clauses are engaged in the
painstaking process of reviewing their ethics codes and attempting
to predict the constitutionality of the remaining speech and conduct
Finally, the court noted, "[i]t is exactly this [prohibited] activity that
potentially creates a bias, or at least the appearance of bias, for or against a
party to a proceeding." Id. No petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court appears to have been filed in this case.
132. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
133. Id. at 1049.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, No. 99-4021, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10232 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004). The court heard oral arguments in the
case the week of October 18, 2004. The arguments can be heard on the
website for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, at
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/case/csFrame.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
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provisions. Of particular concern are the inconsistent decisions
reached by courts addressing lawsuits challenging other provisions.
The inconsistencies only increase the difficulty faced by state
judicial commissions and judges.
Because the American Bar Association predicted"' that
other provisions of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct would run
afoul of the First Amendment, the organization recommended that
a definition of impartiality consistent with White be added to the
Code. 39  The drafters hoped that restrictions on judicial speech
would survive constitutional attacks if a definition of impartiality
was added to the Code; if each restriction was narrowly drawn to
further a compelling state interest; and if the restrictions applied to
138. The issue of judicial independence had been on the American Bar
Association's radar screen for several years, but had been a prime issue since
at least the fall of 1996, when both candidates for President of the United
States called for the resignation or impeachment of Judge Harold Baer, Jr., a
federal district judge, due to a decision he reached on a suppression motion.
American Judicature Society, Political Threats to Judicial Independence, at
http://www.ajs.org/cji/cji-politicalthreats.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review).
A Standing Committee on Judicial Independence was created by the
American Bar Association shortly after the Judge Baer fiasco. In September,
2001, the Committee formed a Working Group on the First Amendment and
Judicial Campaigns. The group was working to evaluate Canon 5, the political
activities provision, of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct when the White
decision was released. Joint Comm'n to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, Am. Bar Ass'n, Background Paper, at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/about/background.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
139. See Ed O'Brien, Am. Bar Ass'n, Independent Courts: How
Important Are They? n.6, available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/resources/indcourtsarticle. "Impartial" or
"impartiality" is now defined in the Terminology section of the Code as
"denot[ing] absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular
parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in
considering issues that may come before the judge." See MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2003),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/pream term.html#TERMINOLOGY. The
term is referenced in five sections and several comments in the Code. A draft
of proposed revisions to the code was released on January 28, 2005. Press
Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Commission Releases Draft Revisions to
Judicial Ethics Code Rules About Political Activity, at
http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news012805.html (Jan. 28, 2005).
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all of the judge's official duties, not just campaign speech, thereby
avoiding a claim of underinclusiveness. At its annual meeting in
August 2003, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
-- 141
adopted the amendments.
140. To this end, the Code now contains two provisions, Canon 3(B)(10)
and Canon 3(E)(1)(f), which provide, respectively:
A judge shall not, with respect to cases, controversies or
issues that are likely to come before the court, make
pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent
with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties
of the office.
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding
in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(f) the judge, while a judge or a candidate for judicial
office, has made a public statement that commits, or
appears to commit, the judge with respect to (i) an issue in
the proceeding; or (ii) the controversy in the proceeding.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3(B)(1) and 3(E)(1)(f) (1999).
The comments to these new rules attempt to vigorously assert the state
interest. For example, the comment to Canon 3(B)(10) provides that these
"restrictions on judicial speech are essential to the maintenance of the
integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3(B)(10) cmt. (1999).
141. Eileen Gallagher, Judicial Ethics and The First Amendment - A
Survey of States, 42 THE JUDGES' J. 26, 28 (Spring 2003). The campaign speech
amendments provide:
(3) A candidate for a judicial office: (a) shall maintain the
dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner
consistent with the impartiality, integrity and
independence of the judiciary, and shall encourage
members of the candidate's family to adhere to the same
standards of political conduct in support of the candidate
as apply to the candidate;
(d) shall not: (i) with respect to cases, controversies, or
issues that are likely to come before the court, make
pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent
with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties
of the office ....
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5A(3)(a) & (d)(i) (2003). Some
of the related comments to the rules were revised as well.
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The effect of the amendments pertaining to judicial speech
is to combine the previous pledges and promises and commitment
clauses into one rule, to tie that rule to a vigorously asserted state
interest in impartiality, and to require adherence to that compelling
state interest in all of a judge's activities, not just his or her
campaign conduct. Commentary has been added to three canons to
emphasize the importance of an impartial and independent
142judiciary.
In addition to these modifications, 4u the ABA Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence undertook a comprehensive
review of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct to be
completed and submitted for possible adoption by early 2005.44
Throughout the proposed draft provisions, the Commission's
concern with First Amendment challenges is obvious. For example,
in Canon 1, the proposed draft adds the following commentary: "A
judiciary of integrity is one in which judges are known for their
probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character.
An independent judiciary is one free of inappropriate outside
influences.
145
This commitment to preserving an independent judiciary is
also apparent in the draft revisions of Canon 5. The proposed
Canon provides that a "judge or candidate for judicial office shall
refrain from political activity that is inconsistent with the
impartiality, integrity and independence of the judiciary."' 46 In
142. See O'Brien, supra note 139.
143. A number of states including Arizona, Minnesota, and New Mexico
have proposed or adopted amendments to their state judicial ethics rules to
incorporate these changes. The New York Commission to Promote Public
Confidence in Judicial Elections has recommended some of the changes in the
ABA amendments to the Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals.
The N.Y. Comm'n to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections,
Appendix C: Proposed Changes to Part 100 of the Rules of the Chief
Administrator of the Courts Governing Judicial Conduct, at
http://Iaw.fordham.edu/commission/judicialelections (Dec. 2003).
144. ABA Joint Comm'n to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, Background Paper, at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/about/background.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
145. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. (2003).
146. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Commission Releases Draft
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announcing this proposal, the Commission stated its intent that
revised Canon 5 would "continue to restrict judges from engaging
in politics, except during campaigns for election or appointment,
and even then would confine judges' activity as closely as permitted
under recent court rulings.'
47
VI. AFTER WHITE, Now WHAT?
As the American Bar Association works to lend guidance,
some states scurry to act on their own while others await the ABA
revisions. The underlying motivation is the same: to assure a fair,
impartial, respected state judiciary notwithstanding the now
recognized right of judges, as candidates, to announce their views
on legal issues while seeking the office.
If, as is predicted here, the decision in White will have
devastating effects on state judiciaries, what can a state do to assure
the impartiality of and respect for its judiciary? How can a state
assure its citizens that their elected judges will not have prejudged
issues without hearing the evidence or argument?
At least six "solutions" have been tried or suggested. Each
of these solutions is discussed below. Three of these were
previewed in the Supreme Court's decision in White. The other
three are in various stages of experimentation in the states.
Whether any will have the desired effect of accommodating First
Amendment rights without sacrificing judicial independence, the
crown jewel48 of the American judiciary, remains to be determined.
Revisions to Judicial Ethics Code Rules About Political Activity, at
http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news012805.html (Jan. 28, 2005). The
proposal differentiates between those who are currently candidates and those
who are not and imposes more restrictions in the latter case.
147. Id.
148. Numerous sources have credited Chief Justice William Rehnquist
with calling the independent American judiciary the "crown jewel of
American democracy." See, e.g., Justice at Stake, Court-Stripping Back in
Fashion as Congress, Executive Seek to Limit Power of Courts to Protect
Rights, at http://justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=3,436 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review); see
also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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A. Change the Rules
As the efforts of the American Bar Association and some
states demonstrate, one solution is to change the rules. Rule
changing, unfortunately, is not one-size-fits-all; many states have
their own idiosyncrasies with which they must deal. Alabama is a
prime example.
As a state in the Eleventh Circuit, Alabama was faced not11149
only with White, but with Weaver as well. The Alabama Code of
Judicial Conduct contained both a pledges and promises clause and
a misleading statement clause.15 °  The latter had an intent
requirement similar to the one in Georgia's "false statement"
provision invalidated in Weaver. When the Alabama misleading
statement provision was attacked on First Amendment grounds,
prior to either the White or Weaver decisions,"' the Alabama
149. The sua sponte portion of the Weaver decision struck portions of the
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct that were virtually identical to the
provisions in other states, including Alabama. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d
1312, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2002).
150. The Alabama rule provided:
During the course of any campaign for nomination or
election to judicial office, a candidate shall not.., post,
publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute false
information concerning a judicial candidate or an
opponent, either knowing the information to be false or
with reckless disregard of whether the information is false;
or post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or
distribute true information about a judicial candidate or
an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading to a
reasonable person.
ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7B(2) (2002).
151. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207, 216 (Ala.
2001). In fact, Butler was viewed as significant precedent by the Eleventh
Circuit in Weaver, as was a prior Michigan Supreme Court decision, In re
Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000). The relevant provision of the Michigan
Code of Judicial Conduct was described by the Eleventh Circuit in Weaver as
"nearly identical" to the Georgia provision. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322 n.12.
Canon (7)(B)(1)(d) of the Michigan Code provides that:
[A] candidate for judicial office, including an incumbent
judge, should not use or participate in the use of any form
of public communication that the candidate knows or
[Vol. 3
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Supreme Court invalidated the provision as written and modified it
to prohibit only knowing or reckless false statements. 5 2 With that
hurdle behind it, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission now
faced interpreting White and Weaver in an election year.
To comply with the Eleventh Circuit's invalidation of the
personal solicitation provision, the Alabama Supreme Court
Standing Committee on Judicial Canons and Ethics recommended
that the parallel Alabama canon, which prohibited personal
solicitation of funds, be changed to "strongly discourage" a
candidate from "personally soliciting campaign contributions. '
Compliance with the White decision would not prove as simple.
While White was pending, all Alabama state judges received a
questionnaire from the Christian Coalition of Alabama, which the
Coalition intended to use to formulate a voter's guide. The
questionnaire asked the candidates to respond to each question by
marking either "agree," "disagree," "undecided," or "decline." The
responses, but no narrative or explanations, were to be published in
reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, or which contains a material misrepresentation
of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading, or which is likely to create an unjustified
expectation about results the candidate can achieve.
Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 36. The Alabama provision, though substantially
different, was before the Eleventh Circuit for review in 2001, Butler v. Ala.
Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 245 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), but because of
pending disciplinary proceedings in Alabama, the appeals court remanded the
case with certified state law questions concerning abstention. Id. at 1265-66.
On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court declared the provision in violation
of the First Amendment and narrowed the Canon to apply only to knowing or
recklessly negligent false statements. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n,
802 So. 2d 207, 218 (Ala. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit then found that the
issue was moot. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 261 F.3d 1154, 1157-
58 (11th Cir. 2001).
152. Butler, 802 So. 2d at 218.
153. The Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics provides in Canon 7(B)(4)
that "candidates shall not personally solicit campaign contributions." ALA.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(4) (2002). The parallel Georgia
provision, invalidated by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, prohibited
judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions and
public support. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322.
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the voter's guide.
The questions asked the candidates' views on "a number of
social and political issues such as abortion, gun control, and the role
of a judge's religious belief in decision making. 15 4  Judges and
judicial candidates seeking election asked the Alabama Judicial
Inquiry Commission whether the Alabama ethics rules allowed
them to reply. Initially, the Commission answered "no" '155 and
offered this explanation:
The inquiries under consideration in the
questionnaire at issue call for or appear to
solicit the judicial candidate's predisposition
toward specific legal views on matters pending
or impending before any number of trial and
appellate courts .... A judge's response to
such questions would clearly violate [the
canons] .... Such remarks raise the "red flag"
of potential bias.156
The Alabama judicial code did not prohibit candidates from
announcing their views as had Minnesota's, but instead prohibited a
candidate from announcing "in advance the candidate's conclusions
of law on pending litigation., 15 7 In addition, a separate provision in
Canon 7(B) prohibited promises "other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of office." The Commission
relied on these two provisions, as well as a third prohibiting public
comments on pending cases and requiring impartiality and
integrity, for its opinion that judges could not respond to the
154. Christian Coalition of Ala. v. Cole, 355 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir.
2004). The Christian Coalition of America's website includes among its
agenda items the passage of legislation to prohibit civil rights for domestic
partners, to require notice for minor's abortions, to restrict abortion rights of
adults, and to allow states to display the Ten Commandments. Christian
Coalition of America, Agenda for the 10h Congress (2003-2004), at
http://www.cc.org/issues.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review).
155. Answering Questions to Be Used in Preparation for Organization's
Voters Guide, Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Op. 00-763 (September 8, 2000)
(this opinion was subsequently withdrawn on July 19, 2002).
156. Id.
157. ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7B(1)(a) & (c) (2002).
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questionnaire.
In response to the Commission's opinion, the Christian
Coalition of Alabama first reduced the number of questions from
thirty to fifteen, and then joined with three candidates running for
Alabama judgeships to sue the Commission in federal court.' The
district court initially enjoined the enforcement of the restrictions in
the Judicial Inquiry Commission's opinion but abstained from
reaching the merits of the issue, deferring to the state court. 9 The
decision in White was released before the district court could
comply with the Eleventh Circuit's reversal and remand. The
Commission withdrew the opinion and ultimately succeeded in
having the lawsuit dismissed as moot."6
Following White and the hasty withdrawal of the
Commission's Advisory Opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court's
Standing Committee on Judicial Canons and Ethics recommended
that the canons be supplemented with an explanation of the
requirement of judicial integrity, but did not recommend any
changes in the remaining announce and promises provisions.
The Alabama Commission's defensive and hasty reaction is
illustrative of actions taken by other states; an action perhaps
indicating fear, certainly indicating a desire to avoid litigation, and
an action the result of which in an over-application of White.
An example of what happens when a state does not "change
the rules" occurred in Alaska where state judges face retention
votes."' Judges and judicial candidates received a questionnaire
158. See Christian Coalition of Ala, 355 F.3d at 1290 (reciting history of
litigation).
159. Pittman v. Cole, 117 F. Supp.2d 1285, 1315 (S.D. Ala. 2000). On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court decision and ordered
the court to certify questions to the Alabama Supreme Court, but to address
the merits of the controversy, after receiving the state court's answers to
questions that were determinative. Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2001).
160. See Christian Coalition of Ala., 355 F.3d at 1290.
161. That special interest groups solicit answers to questions from judges
subject to retention elections proves the point that, despite the argument that
White applies only to judges who are elected, the decision will impact even
those jurisdictions where judges are retained either by vote of the citizenry or
the legislature.
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from the state Right-to-Life Committee. Utilizing the same four-
choice response system as did the Alabama Christian Coalition, the
questionnaire asked judges to mark "agree," "disagree,"
"undecided," or "decline" with regard to statements such as this:
Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow
binding precedent of higher courts and
applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide
any future case based on the law and facts of
that case, in accord with the position of the
Alaska Right to Life Committee, I believe that
the unborn child is biologically human and
alive and that the right to life of human beings
should be respected at every stage of their
, 162
biological development.
The Alaska questionnaire was introduced with this
statement:
The Alaska Right to Life Committee certainly
recognizes that judicial candidates should
maintain actual and apparent impartiality [and]
should not pledge or promise certain results in
particular cases that may come before
162. Candidate Questionnaire from Alaska Right to Life Committee 3
[hereinafter Candidate Questionnaire] (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review). In the 2003 Pennsylvania judicial races, the questions included:
Do you support the rights of LGBT (lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgendered) people to the following: a.
marriage? b. protection from discrimination in
employment, housing and access to public
accommodations? ... Do you support the death penalty?
Do you support restricting abortion rights in
Pennsylvania? If so, which restrictions do you
support? ... Do you believe a parent's sexual orientation
should be a determining or influencing factor in custody
decisions?
PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN CTS., As PENNSYLVANIA GOES, So GOES THE
NATION: A CASE STUDY OF A SUPREME COURT ELECTION IN THE POST-
WHITE ERA (Aug. 2004), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/PennsylvaniaReport.pdf (internal citations
omitted).
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them .... This questionnaire is intended to elicit
candidates' views on issues of vital interest to
the constituents of the Alaska Right to Life
Committee without subjecting candidates
answering its questions of accusations of
impartiality or requiring candidates to recuse
163
themselves in future cases.
The questionnaire mirrored a similar questionnaire sent to
candidates in Indiana, which, according to one source, was
accompanied by a legal opinion, authored by counsel for some of
the plaintiffs in White'6 advising judges that the questionnaire
included "only questions with answers protected by the First
Amendment."1
65
The Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct responded to
the Alaska Right to Life Committee and warned its judges that,
should they answer the questions, they would create "situations that
would require them to be disqualified from sitting on cases
163. Candidate Questionnaire, supra note 162, at 1.
164. According to the Justice at Stake Newsletter, Eyes on Justice, the
letter was written by James Bopp, of Bopp, Coleson, and Bostrom, Terra
Haute, Indiana. Campaign Speech: Loose Lips on the Campaign Trail, EYES
ON JUSTICE (Justice at Stake, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 24, 2002 at 4 (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review). James Bopp is General Counsel to
the National Right to Life Committee. Bopp's resume lists that he is currently
President of the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and
Disabled, Inc., General Counsel for the James Madison Center for Free
Speech, and General Counsel for the Opportunity Project of Indiana, Inc.
Resume of James Bopp, Jr., Esq., available at
http://www.jamesmadisoncenter.org/Documents/Bopp%20Resume%209.3.04.
pdf.
165. Campaign Speech, supra note 164. It would not be overly
speculative to suggest that the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
rather than those of the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct, could have
been the next defendant. Apparently, the Indiana Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, which had previously counseled judges against making
"pledges or promises of conduct in office and against making statements which
appear to commit the candidates to the outcomes of cases," issued an opinion
amending its prior advice, but asserting that it would continue to enforce the
pledges and promises and commitment provisions. See generally Permissible
Campaign Speech, Ind. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Op. No. 1-02
(2002).
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involving those issues."' 66 The Commission and its members were
sued, on October 1, 2004, in a suit filed in federal district court
seeking to block enforcement of the Alaska rules and brought by a
resident of the North Pole who sought information on state judicial
candidates. 167 The lawsuit requests a preliminary injunction against
the enforcement of the Alaska rules.'6 The contrast between the
Alabama and Alaska situations suggests that the "change the rules
solution" is economically attractive, albeit timid.
B. Appoint the Judges
Some would suggest that shifting the selection of the
judiciary from the electorate to an appointing authority is a
166. Letter from Maria N. Greenstein, Executive Director, Alaska
Commission on Judicial Conduct, to Karen Vosburgh, Executive Director,
Alaska Right to Life (Oct. 16, 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review). According to a lawsuit filed against the Commission, the
Commission advised judges that "questions that reflect a pre-judgment of a
controversial issue or judicial philosophy that could predict outcome in a case
are to be avoided." Id.
167. Press Release, James Madison Center, Alaska Rules on Judicial
Speech Challenged (Oct. 1, 2004),
http://www.jamesmadisoncenter.org/Test/content.html.
168. Id. The suit suggested urgency in order to enable the Right-to-Life
Committee to receive and publish the judge's responses before the November,
2004, retention election. Id.
A lawsuit similar to the one filed in Alaska was filed in Kentucky by the
Family Trust Foundation. The Foundation sought answers to a survey from
candidates for judicial office in the November 2004 election. Based on the
Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, several Kentucky judges declined to
respond; others sought guidance from the Kentucky Judicial Conduct
Commission. As a result the Family Trust Foundation sued. The federal
court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted an injunction against the
enforcement of the pledges and promises clause of the Kentucky Code of
Judicial Conduct. Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 245 F. Supp.
2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004). The district judge acknowledged that White did not
involve a promises clause, but found the difference between the two clauses to
be "simply one of a label." Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 388
F.3d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 2004). The Sixth Circuit agreed that the pledges and
promises clause was the "functional equivalent" of the announce clause struck
down in White and thus declined to stay the enforcement of the injunction. Id.
at 228.
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"solution" to the problems created by White. The majority decision
in White was reached, presumably, because Minnesota chose to
allow its citizens to elect its judges. The issue was phrased and
decided in terms of the "right" of "candidates for judicial office."'69
Once the state chose to place judicial selection in the political
arena, it was required to honor the accouterments of political
speech and to accept the accompanying risks to judicial integrity.
For the majority, for example, Justice Scalia wrote, relying
on two voting rights cases:
The greater power to dispense with elections
altogether does not include the lesser power to
conduct elections under conditions of state-
imposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses
to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of
the democratic process, it must accord the
participants in that process... the First
• 170
Amendment rights that attach to their roles.
Similarly, Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, suggested
some solutions for the state, including the adoption of ethics codes
and recusal standards, but concluded that "[w]hat Minnesota may
not do... is censor what the people hear as they undertake to
decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an
exemplary judicial officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate
speech is the right of the voters, not the State.' 17' Thus, the First
Amendment has its "fullest and most urgent application precisely
to the conduct of campaigns for political office."' 72
169. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 769 (2002).
170. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1988)).
171. Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
172. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (citations
omitted). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976) (per curiam)
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)) (citations omitted). In that case the majority held:
[I]t is of particular importance that candidates have the
unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that
the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates'
personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues
20041
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Most direct of all Justices on this point was Justice
O'Connor, who contrasted the Minnesota choice of electing judges
with an "appointment system or a combined appointment and
retention election system.' 73  What Justice O'Connor expressed
and the majority implied was that states could remove the risk of
judicial bias by removing judges from the electoral process. Justice
O'Connor even opined that among the solutions would be a
174
combined appointment/retention system.
This suggestion ignores the reality that judges who are
retained by the voters or the legislature, just as judges who are
popularly elected, will be called upon to "announce" their views.
Judges, subject to retention - not election - have been targeted by
special interest campaigns; similarly, legislators have selectively
scrutinized some judges facing legislative appointment based on
politically unpopular decisions.1
15
before choosing among them on election day. Mr. Justice
Brandeis' observation that in our country "public
discussion is a political duty" applies with special force to
candidates for public office.
Id.
173. White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Justice David Lanphier was a retention judge who was voted off the
court as a result of two issues on which he wrote for the Nebraska Supreme
Court. The first concerned a term limits initiative that had been approved by
the voters. The other issue - whether malice was a required element of
second-degree murder - resulted in the reversal of a number of murder
convictions, as a result of returning malice as a required element of second-
degree murder. Those who opposed the rulings joined to form Citizens for
Responsible Judges, which raised and spent money to defeat Justice Lanphier
but refused to comply with the state's campaign disclosure laws, arguing that
the law did not apply to judicial retention races. Am. Judicature Society,
Judicial Selection in Nebraska: An Introduction, at
http://www.ajs.org/js/NE.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review). Some might suggest another example occurred in
Tennessee and involved the author of this article. See The Constitution
Project, Examples of Intimidation, at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/ci/newsroom-guide/38.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
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C. Trust Democracy
Another "solution" offered expressly by Justice Kennedy
may be summarized as "trust democracy." In his concurrence he
opined:
If Minnesota believes that certain sorts of
candidate speech disclose flaws in the
candidate's credentials, democracy and free
speech are their own correctives. The legal
profession, the legal academy, the press,
voluntary groups, political and civic leaders,
and all interested citizens can use their own
First Amendment freedoms to protest
statements inconsistent with the standards of
judicial neutrality and judicial excellence.
Indeed, if democracy is to fulfill its promise,
they must do so. They must reach voters who
are uninterested or uninformed or blinded by
partisanship, and they must urge upon voters a
higher and better understanding of the judicial
function and a stronger commitment to
preserving its finest traditions. Free elections
and free speech are a powerful combination:
Together they may advance our understanding
of the rule of law and further a commitment to
176its precepts.
At least two problems with this "solution" are obvious.
First, as has been well documented, voters do not "turn out" for
judicial elections. 117 One scholar has identified this phenomenon as
176. 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177. Charles Gardner Greyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST.
L. J. 43,52-3 (2003). In his article, Greyh explains:
Eighty percent public support for judicial elections is the
first of four political realities in the "Axiom of 80." The
second political reality is in tension with the first: despite
the overwhelming popularity of judicial elections on a
conceptual level, it is not uncommon to find that 80% or
more of eligible voters fail to vote in judicial elections.
2004] 57
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the "Axiom of 80:"
Eighty percent of the public favors electing
their judges; eighty percent of the electorate
does not vote in judicial races; eighty percent is
unable to identify the candidates for judicial
office; and eighty percent believes that when
judges are elected, they are subject to influence
from the campaign contributors who made the
judges' election possible..
A second problem is that those who do vote may be
uniquely motivated. Citizens in Oregon, for example, anxious for
an opportunity to vote against incumbents, proposed an initiative
that would add "none of the above" as a choice in all judicial races
in which a candidate was unopposed. 9 Citizens in Colorado also
mounted a campaign, the platform of which was "Vote No On All
Judges."
Not only do suspect motives surface among individual
voters, but special interest groups, business groups, and political
On the one hand, when judicial and political branch
candidates share the same ballot, there is a well-
documented "roll off" of voters, who cast ballots in the
political branch races but not the judicial. On the other
hand, when judicial elections do not share the ballot with
high-profile political branch contests, voters simply stay
home.
Id. at 53.
178. Id. at 43.
179. In 2000, an Oregon tax reform advocate, angered by a series of
controversial court rulings which reversed voter-approved initiatives and by
the release in 2000 of a death row inmate on speedy trial grounds, proposed
Measure 21. In order to allow voters to express their displeasure with races in
which judicial candidates were unopposed, Measure 21 would have added a
"None of the Above" selection in each such race. Despite strong opposition
from citizens groups, judges and former judges, former governors,
conservationist and land use groups, the American Civil Liberties Union of
Oregon, Planned Parenthood Advocates of Oregon, the Oregon State Bar,
and the League of Women Voters of Oregon, the "None of the Above"
measure was rejected only by a 44-56 margin. Am. Judicature Society, Judicial
Selection in the States, Oregon History of Judicial Reform, at
http://www.ajs.org/js/OR history.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review).
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parties promote candidates they believe will represent their
interests once on the bench. Often the publicized promotions and
advertisements do not identify the sponsors, choosing instead to
refer viewers to web sites such as "litigationfairness.org" or
"citizensforfaircourts.org."'8 Trusting democracy, as patriotic and
honorable as it may sound, may not be the surest guarantee of an
impartial and independent judiciary.
D. Rely on Honor
Several commentators have remained optimistic that the
honorable men and women who comprise the state judiciaries will
prove to be the "solution" to the dilemma created by White.
181
Justice Kennedy warned that a condemnation of the process of
elections would be an unfair criticism of "countless elected states
judges and without warrant, [m]any of [whom], despite the
difficulties imposed by the elected system, have discovered in the
law the enlightenment, instruction and inspiration that make them
independent-minded and faithful jurists of real integrity. ' '1
Even if a majority of judges are "independent-minded and
faithful jurists of real integrity," the White decision has helped
180. The United States Chamber of Commerce, for example, in the 2000
Mississippi Supreme Court race used the banner "LitigationFairness.org" at
the end of their advertisements. Chamber of Commerce of the United States
v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, U.S. LEXIS 8339
(2002). Mississippi law required any person spending a designated amount of
money on campaigns to file an expenditure disclosure form with the state.
The Chamber of Commerce challenged the law, and ultimately prevailed in
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Id.
181. Despite my own strong disagreement with the majority's ruling, I
stated in a speech given in the spring of 2003 that "every judge has a choice -
to exercise his or her First Amendment rights, to further obscure the vast
differences between the role of judges and the role of other government
actors, or to forsake personal freedom for a greater liberty, a lasting legacy in
America... of an independent [judiciary]." See White, supra note 9, at 625.
182. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("We should not, even by inadvertence, 'impute to
judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor."') (quoting Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941)).
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convince the majority of citizens otherwise. More than eighty
percent of Americans are concerned that the decision in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White will result in pressure being placed on
judicial candidates by special interest groups to take positions on
controversial issues; and more than seventy percent of Americans -
and nearly eighty percent of African Americans - believe that
special interest campaign contributions already influence judicial
decisions in the courtroom. 18 This perception of justice is the one
with which we must contend, even if the citizens are incorrect.
E. Fund the Elections
One "solution" for which North Carolina has been
applauded is the "fund the elections" solution.'8 In late 2002, the
governor of North Carolina signed into law the nation's "first full-
funding system for judicial elections.' ' 185 Some suggest this new law
set the stage for "a new wave of reforms in states worried about the
growing tidal wave of money in court campaigns."' 86
As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion in
White, "campaigning for a judicial post today can require
substantial funds."' 87 Since the belief that money influences judicial
183. Justice at Stake, March 2004 Survey Highlights: Americans Speak
Out on Judicial Elections, at http://faircourts.org/files/ZogbyPollFactSheet.pdf
(March 17-19, 2004).
184. Press Release, Justice at Stake, North Carolina Adopts Public
Financing for Supreme Court and Appellate Judicial Campaigns (Oct. 10,
2002) [hereinafter North Carolina Adopts Public Financing] (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 536 U.S. at 789 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing as examples the
Alabama 2000 Supreme Court race, which cost more than one million dollars;
a 1995 Pennsylvania Supreme Court candidate who spent 1.8 million dollars; a
1986 Ohio Chief Justice candidate who spent 2.7 million dollars). If anything,
Justice O'Connor's concern, and the examples she cites, are an
understatement. In 2002, more than 29 million dollars was spent on state
supreme court races. Kathleen Hunter, Money Mattering More in Judicial
Elections, STATELINE.ORG, at
http://www.stateline.org/stateline/?pa=story&sa=showstorylnfo&id=371284
(May 12, 2004). In seven states, supreme court races costs more than one
million dollars, with the average candidate spending almost $800,000. And,
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decisions undermines respect for the judiciary, and since most
voters believe that campaign contributions do influence decision
making,90 the North Carolina solution is based on the belief that
public financing would eliminate the perception that "justice may
be for sale. '89
Some states seem to share a belief that public financing may
be a viable solution to the conflict created by White. At least seven
other states reportedly are studying or proposing forms of public
financing for judicial elections, 190 and, furthermore, citizens seem to
• 191
approve of the idea.
money counts - winners have out-raised losers in state supreme court races by
a margin of 91 million dollars to 53 million dollars. In twenty of twenty-five
contested supreme court races in the most recent election, the top money
raiser won the seat. Id.
An American Bar Association Commission found "a pervasive public
perception that campaign contributions influence judicial decision-making."
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 2 (2002),
available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/Justice/articles-publications/publications/ udca
mpaigns_20020201/commissionreport.pdf.
If 2003 was any indication, and if the Brennan Center for Justice is right
in its predictions, the spending for 2004 may be even higher. Press Release,
Brennan Center, Buying Time 2004: $4.2 Million Already Spent on
Advertising for State Supreme Court Elections (Sept. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2004/pressrelease_2004_09
15.html. The single most expensive race ever for a state supreme court was
run in Pennsylvania in 2003 by Justice Max Baer. Contributions to the two
candidates vying for the seat exceeded 3.34 million dollars, with Baer
outspending his opponent by about $400,000. PENNSYLVANIANS FOR
MODERN CTS., supra note 162.
188. Justice O'Connor cites the Rosner Research survey which indicates
that 76 percent of registered voters believe that campaign contributions
influence judicial decisions. 536 U.S. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, INC. & AMERICAN VIEWPOINT,
NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4 (2001),
available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf).
189. North Carolina Adopts Public Financing, supra note 184.
190. Id. (summarizing efforts in Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio,
Texas, and Wisconsin).
191. A survey by Justice at Stake found that eight of ten voters and six of
ten state judges generally support the idea of publicly funded judicial
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But the public funding solution is not uniformly endorsed
and may also be subject to First Amendment attack.'9 Will North
Carolina, or any state for that matter, be able to convince a federal
court that a compelling state interest justifies a state's limitations on
fund raising and campaign spending? If what a state cannot do "is
censor what people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves
which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial
officer,"' 93 may a state limit a candidate who does not opt to accept
campaigns. Id.
192. Although a discussion of the First Amendment and campaign
financing is beyond the scope of this article, some general observations should
be made. Some states have seen public financing initiatives soundly defeated
by voters who do not want tax dollars spent on elections. Some state courts
have ruled that candidates may not be forced to participate in public financing
schemes, while others have ruled that public finance schemes, which require
some candidate fund-raising to qualify, discriminate against the poor. See The
Brookings Institute, Recent Developments in Campaign Finance Regulation:
Public Financing, at http://www.brookings.org/gs/cf/publicfin.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review); Robert A.
Levy, Public Funding for Judicial Elections: Forget It, CATO INSTITUTE, at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-13-01.html (Aug. 13, 2001).
The outside limits of the constitutional authority seem to be that the
government can act to insulate the electoral process from corruption, violence,
and fraud. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884), the Court held
that without that power, the government would be "left helpless before the
two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and
insidious corruption." Since that early pronouncement, the Court has ruled
frequently on the constitutionality of campaign regulations. In one of the
most famous of those cases, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court
upheld campaign contribution limitations against a First Amendment attack
because of the state's interest in limiting corruption and the appearance of
corruption. Id. at 26-7. Thus, the Court held that
[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure
a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined .... Of almost equal concern
[is]... the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a
regime of large individual financial contributions.
Id. But to what extent a state, or Congress, can require candidates for certain
offices to participate in legislative public financing schemes is an open
question.
193. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002)
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public funds in his or her own fund raising and expenditures? Or is
raising and spending money to get elected political conduct that is
at the "foundation of political freedom?"
F. Recuse the Judge
Some states have determined that an aggressive recusal
remedy may be an answer to the dilemma created by White.194 The
draft proposed amendments to the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, under study by the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, contains this new recusal
provision: "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself if the judge,
while a judge or a candidate for judicial office, has made a public
statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge with
respect to an issue in the proceeding or the controversy in the
proceeding."' 95 A comment to the proposed rule suggests that a
judge disclose information "that the judge believes the parties or
their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for
disqualification. "'96
When special interest groups submitted their questionnaires
to judges in Alaska, the Alaska Judicial Qualifications Commission
advised the groups that judges who responded to the group's
questionnaires might be required to recuse themselves in cases
concerning the issue.l97 Similarly, in a letter responding to judges'
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. See generally J.J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, AFTER WHITE:
DEFENDING AND AMENDING CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 23 (2004),
http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/ji/ji4.pdf (discussing recent attacks on
canons and possible responses); see also State v. Stockert, 684 N.W.2d 605, 616
(N.D. 2004) (Maring, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's holding that
judge did not need to recuse himself despite fact that victim's uncle was
judge's campaign manager).
195. ABA JOINT COMM. TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, DRAFT CANON 2.12(F) 11 (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/draftcanon2_051104.pdf.
196. Id. Commentary [2] at 12.
197. Alaska, like many states, has a judicial peremptory disqualification
statute. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (2004); see Maria Greenstein, Judicial
Disqualification in Alaska Courts, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 53 (2000). Thus, in
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inquiries about the impact of White, the North Dakota Judicial
Ethics Advisory Committee advised that "[c]andidates should note
the disqualification provisions of... the North Dakota Code of
Judicial Conduct. Any candidate that takes a position on legal or
political issues may be required to recuse from a case if her or his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' 98
In some states, the state's highest court, rather than the
state body that disciplines judges, has advised judges of the recusal
remedy. To that end, the Missouri Supreme Court, in an opinion
that notified candidates of the unenforceability of the Missouri
announce clause' 99 and the continued viability of the pledges and
promises clause, offered this caution: "Recusal, or other remedial
action, may nonetheless be required of any judge in cases that
involve an issue about which the judge has announced his or her
views as otherwise may be appropriate under the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
,200
The idea of requiring sitting judges to recuse themselves
when their impartiality may be questioned in the state system2°1 is
not new. It is, however, arguably untested, at least in the post-
White environment.2°
Alaska, even if a judge declined to disqualify himself from a case, the litigants
would have a statutory right to recusal "once during the proceeding" provided
that the action by the litigant was taken in good faith. Id.
198. Letter from Ronald E. Goodman, Chair, Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee, to judicial candidates (August 22, 2002), available at
http://www.court.state.nd.us/_court/committees/jud-ethc/canlet.htm.
199. To the surprise of many, Missouri elects some of its judges. The
Missouri Judiciary, Selection of Supreme Court Justices, at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/Judges?OpenView (last visited Feb.
17, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
200. Id. The July 18, 2002, Order of the Missouri Supreme Court,
entitled In re: Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c), provided that the
announce provision would not be enforced against candidates for judicial
office "that is filled [b]y public election between competing candidates" or
"[b]y candidates appointed to or retained in office ... but only when their
candidacy has drawn active opposition." Id.
201. Recusal of federal judges is addressed by congressional statutes and
by Supreme Court decisions. It has been frequently discussed and debated.
See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html.
202. See generally Matthew D. Besser, May I Be Recused? The Tension
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Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in White
suggested recusal as a viable answer to the problems White would
create, but then planted a seed of doubt that certainly will be
fertilized by those aggressively working to expand White. First,
Justice Kennedy recognized the importance of the state's asserted
interest in judicial integrity, an interest which he proposed could be
protected by "[a]rticulated standards of judicial conduct,"203 rather
than limiting a candidate's speech.
Explicit standards of judicial conduct provide
essential guidance for judges in the proper
discharge of their duties and the honorable
conduct of their office.... Yet these standards
may not be used by the State to abridge the
speech of aspiring judges in a judicial
campaign.
... [The state] may adopt recusal standards
more rigorous than due process requires, and
204
censure judges who violate these standards.
While the Court has drawn the constitutional limits on
judicial recusal at the due process line, it has often asserted that the
205
states and Congress are entitled to draw the lines elsewhere.
Thus, the Court has stated that "[alll questions of judicial
qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would
seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion."
206
Presumably then, a state could adhere to White, but protect its
interest in judicial integrity and both actual and apparent neutrality
by requiring judges who have announced their views during
between Judicial Campaign Speech and Recusal after Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197 (2003).
203. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 794.
205. Besser, supra note 202, at 1219-20.
206. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding further that a
defendant's due process rights are violated if a judge has a "direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest" in a particular conclusion).
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campaigns to recuse themselves in all cases touching on the issues
commented upon.
But is that a safe assumption? If a state is not permitted
after White to regulate the speech of candidates for judicial office,
may that state remove some of the privileges of judicial office, once
acquired, as a result of the exercise of those protected rights?
Again, Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest initially that recusal as a
remedy raised no constitutional issue. He treated the state's right
to promulgate and enforce standards of judicial conduct as a given.
But indirectly, almost as if to assure that he did not predict a future
outcome, he retreated:
This case does not present the question
whether a State may restrict the speech of
judges because they are judges - for example,
as part of a code of judicial conduct ....
Whether the rationale of Pickering v. Board. of
Ed. Of Township High School Dist. 205, Will
Cty. and Connick v. Myers could be extended
to allow a general speech restriction of sitting
judges - regardless of whether they are
campaigning - in order to promote the efficient
administration of justice, is not an issue raised
here.207
Admittedly, Justice Kennedy's comment concerned whether
states could restrict public statements by judges after they attained
the bench,208 but his acknowledgment that the state's right in that
207. 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will
County, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), the court held that the Court's task is to
"arrive at a balance between the interests of the [government employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." Similarly, in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 142 (1983), the Court reiterated the balance test set forth in Pickering.
208. Many, perhaps most states, have not seriously questioned whether
ethics rules can constitutionally limit what a sitting judge may say. Ohio, for
example, in its eleventh guideline for judicial candidates, issued after White,
states that "[j]udicial speech is not only restrained in the context of judicial
campaigns - an incumbent judge has ethical restrictions on judicial speech,
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regard had not been ruled upon by the Court raises a red flag for
mandatory recusal provisions as well.
Even if it is unlikely that mandatory recusal provisions
would be found to conflict with a judge's First Amendment rights,
White is already impacting the way judges and conduct commissions
view judicial conduct. Three recent cases bear on this issue. One
case involved a sitting state appellate judge who was admonished as
a result of public statements he made to a state legislative caucus.29
The judge told the Arkansas Legislative Black Caucus that the
recent firing of a basketball coach at the University of Arkansas at
Fayetteville had been racially motivated."O Following the issuance
of an admonishment, the judge challenged the constitutionality of
the Commission's action in a federal lawsuit.2 ' Despite obvious
regardless of whether he or she is engaged in a judicial campaign." Bd. Of
Comm'rs on Grievances and Disciplines Op. 2002-8 (Aug. 9, 2002).
Another state that does not share my concern about Justice Kennedy's
statement is Maine. In In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003), cert. denied,
158 L. Ed.2d 401, 124 S. Ct 1722 (2004), the Maine Supreme Court referred to
the same comment by Justice Kennedy in his White concurrence as
"suggesting that the rationale of Pickering... and Connick... might be
extended to permit 'a general speech restriction on sitting judge[s]... in order
to promote the efficient administration of justice."' 838 A.2d at 350 (citations
omitted) (quoting White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
209. Judge Wendell Griffen appeared before the Arkansas Legislative
Black Caucus in the wake of the termination of Nolan Richardson, the
basketball coach at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. Judge Griffen
expressed his belief that the dismissal of the coach was racially motivated. He
urged the caucus to "send [the University] a budgetary vote of no confidence
concerning sorry leadership about racial inclusion over the past 130 years at
the University of Arkansas. SHOW THEM THE MONEY." Griffen v. Ark.
Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n., 130 S.W.3d 524, 526-27 (Ark.
2003) (emphasis in original). The judge's comments also appeared in local and
national newspapers. The Arkansas Judicial Commission received three
complaints against Judge Griffen, and ultimately, after investigation and
response, dismissed two of the complaints. Id. at 528. After a hearing, the
Commission voted to admonish the judge only for violating Canon 4C(1) of
the Arkansas Judicial Code that prohibited judicial appearances with
legislative bodies "except on matters concerning the law, the legal system or
the administration of justice .... Id. at 528 (quoting Canon 4(C)1).
210. Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 130
S.W.3d 524, 526 (Ark. 2003).
211. Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 266 F.
20041
68 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
discontent with the situation, the district court found that it lacked
212jurisdiction.
Supp.2d 898, 908 (E.D. Ark. 2003).
212. Id. The court concluded its opinion:
The Court enters this opinion with some dismay. Mainly,
the Court sympathizes with Judge Griffen's consternation
over the deafening silence coming from the Commission
and the Arkansas Supreme Court. The Commission and
the Arkansas Supreme Court have decided, thus far, not
to indicate in any manner that they will hear and review
Judge Griffen's constitutional claims. This silence comes
at a time when judges across the country are seeking
guidance from judicial commissions and state supreme
courts about the balance of their ethical obligations and
First Amendment rights.
... Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has no
obligation to step into the fray sua sponte, the gravity of
these issues might dictate that the Arkansas Supreme
Court take a more proactive stance, if the Arkansas
Supreme Court is to weigh in at all.
The Arkansas Supreme Court's silence is unfortunate at a
time when judges are seeking guidance as to how to
preserve their independence, yet also are seeking to
promote the integrity and impartiality of the system.
While a significant number of judges historically have
attempted to seclude themselves in chambers and, at
times, hide behind codes of judicial conduct, those days
have past [sic]. Today's judicial landscape is a
complicated patchwork of restrictions on judges
intermingled with First Amendment considerations. And
judges are attempting to make sense of this patchwork.
The public quite reasonably expects judges to be visible in
the community and to serve as role models and leaders.
And perhaps this is as it should be to promote the public's
faith in the judiciary. A judge has an inherent
responsibility to contribute to the public understanding of
the court's role of preserving the basic freedoms of our
society. A judge also is obligated to assert a leadership
role and to act as a role model. Much of this can be done
without jeopardizing the integrity of the court system. A
judge must always temper his or her leadership role with
the judge's duty to appear impartial, so as not to
compromise the judge's oath of office or the integrity of
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The Supreme Court of Arkansas quashed the
admonishment, concluding that the ethics provision as applied to
213the judge violated his First Amendment rights. White figured
the judiciary. While a judge is not required to surrender
his or her rights or opinions as a citizen, a judge must
accept reasonable restrictions that promote the public's
faith and trust in the system.
This balance is a difficult and delicate one, but it is
entirely manageable. The real issue is achieving and
maintaining such a balance. It calls into question what
restrictions from judicial codes of conduct are reasonably
necessary to promote and manage the public's faith and
trust in the judiciary. While good judges are mindful of
the need to protect the public confidence in the judiciary,
they need guidance as to the interplay between First
Amendment principles, judicial codes of conduct, and
their own leadership roles. That is why guidance at this
time, in the State of Arkansas and across the country, is
paramount. Judges have a right to expect such guidance
from their respective judicial ethics commissions and
supreme courts.
Despite the silence of the Commission and the Arkansas
Supreme Court on this important matter, this Court
cannot review Judge Griffen's claims. Our federal system
commits such decisions to the capable hands of the State
Supreme Courts and the United States Supreme Court;
this Court simply has no jurisdiction over this issue, no
matter how vital it may be. Moreover, based upon the
assertions of Defendants' counsel at oral argument on this
matter, there are no procedural bars to Judge Griffen
bringing his constitutional claims before the Arkansas
Supreme Court. With this in mind, this Court leaves it in
the hands of the Arkansas Supreme Court to provide
guidance to Judge Griffen....
Id. at 907-08.
213. Griffen, 130 S.W.3d at 538. The Arkansas Supreme Court provided
guidance to Judge Griffen, perhaps, in the grant of his requested relief, but the
opinion did little to clarify the provision's future enforceability. The majority
opinion, perhaps intentionally, concluded with statements like "we are hard
pressed to find a violation of the canon," and "without proof of a 'narrow
tailoring' of the exception by the Judicial Commission[,]... [the canon] as
applied to Judge Griffen, violates his First Amendment rights." Id.
Additionally, three justices dissented.
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prominently in the majority's opinion, not for what it held
concerning judicial elections but for what it implied concerning
judicial speech.
In a second case, a sitting judge's off-the-bench statements
in a letter to the editor resulted in a recommendation that he be
sanctioned. The letter did not pertain to an election, but expressed
214
the judge's opinions on gays and lesbians. The judge's statements
first appeared as a letter to the editor of the local newspaper 21' and
The court did conclude its opinion with a request that the Arkansas
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission study the canon and make
recommendations to the court. Id. In July 2004, after receiving the
Commission's recommendations, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted an
amendment to its Code of Judicial Conduct. The amendment provides: "(1) A
judge shall not appear at a public hearing before, or otherwise consult with, an
executive or legislative body or official except on matters concerning the law,
the legal system or the administration of justice." The amendment deleted a
provision of the prior rule ("or except when acting pro se in a matter involving
the judge or the judge's interests"), which had occupied a large part of the
parties' argument in the case. In re Ark. Code of Judicial Conduct, 2004 Ark.
LEXIS 448 (July 1, 2004).
214. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d
1006, 1008 (Miss. 2004) (en banc).
215. In response to an article about rights extended to gay and lesbian
couples in some states, the Justice Court Judge for George County wrote The
George County Times a letter to the editor signed individually and bearing his
home address and phone number with no reference to his position. The 2000
census listed the population of George County as 19,144, with a little more
than fifty percent being male and almost ninety percent being white. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL CENSUS STATISTICS FOR GEORGE COUNTY,
MississiPPi (2000), available at
http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/more.data/28039.html.
The letter was based on what the judge called his "Christian beliefs" and
was stamped "Bro. Connie G. Wilkerson." The full text of the letter was:
Dear Editor:
I got sick on my stomach today as I read the (AP) news
story on the Dog attach [sic] on the front page of THE
MISSISSIPPI PRESS and had to respond!
AMERICA IS IN TROUBLE!
I never thought that we would see the day when such
would be here in AMERICA.
The last verse of chapter one of the book of Romans in
our HOLY BIBLE is my reason for responding and
sounding the alarm to this. You need to know as I know
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later as an interview with a radio reporter and were critical of
gays and lesbians and of courts and legislatures that extended rights
to those individuals.
When the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance
recommended that the judge be sanctioned for his comments, the
judge asserted his First Amendment rights as a defense. The court
held that the judge's comments "constitute religious and
political/public issue speech specially protected by the First
Amendment .... [F]orced concealment of views on political/public
issues serves to further no compelling governmental, public or
judicial interest .... ,217 Of particular importance was the court's
matter-of-fact conclusion that it could not "impose sanctions for
violation of a Canon where doing so would infringe on rights
that GOD in Heaven is not pleased with this and I am
sounding the alarm that I for one am against it and want
our LORD to see and here [sic] me say I am against it.
I am sorry that the California Legislature enacted a law
granting gay partners the same right to sue as spouses or
family members. Also, that Hawaii and Vermont have
enacted such a law too. In my opinion gays and lesbians
should be put in some type of a mental institute instead of
having a law like this passed for them.
I don,t [sic] know but I believe if we vote for folks that are
for this we have to stand in thh [sic] judgement [sic] of
GOD the same as them. I am thankful for our Legislators
and pray for wisdom for them, on such unbelievable
legislation as this. May GOD bless each one of them in
JESUS CHRIST name I pray!
Thank you for printing this.
Connie Glen Wilkerson
Bro. Connie C. Wilkerson
Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1020.
216. Id. at 1008. The phone interview was conducted by the reporter
about two weeks after the judge's letter was published. The judge said that
the reporter encouraged him to repeat the comments he had expressed in his
letter. The judge also said that he did not give permission to the reporter to
air the interview. The interview was aired and was, in the judge's opinion,
"'unfairly interspersed' with comments from known homosexual activists." Id.
217. Id. at 1009. This comment seems to stem from a Fifth Circuit
decision, Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990), in which the circuit
court concluded that promoting an impartial judiciary would be "ill served by
casting a cloak of secrecy around the operations of the courts .... " Id. at 213.
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guaranteed under the First Amendment, including the freedom of
speech."218
Clear differences exist between the imposition of a sanction
against a judge for a violation of ethics rules and the application of
a mandatory recusal rule. When, for example, a judge is censured
or reprimanded based on an ethics violation, regardless of the
specifics, the judge suffers some damage to his reputation. When a
judge is disqualified from participating in a case, such damage does
not necessarily occur. The tradition of recusal carries with it no
badge of dishonor.
But in the post-White climate, is it not to be expected that a
• 219
judge, subject to a mandatory recusal provision, will extrapolate
from the discipline cases the argument that the mandatory recusal
provision in effect "punishes" the judge for exercising valid First
Amendment rights? The penalty imposed is not damage to
reputation per se, but, the recused judge might argue, is instead a
deprivation of the privileges of the office. Has a judge who is
disqualified because of a mandatory recusal provision based upon
218. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1010. The court relied on cases from the
Fifth Circuit, including Scott, 910 F.2d 201, and Morial v. Judiciary
Commission of Louisiana, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1013 (1978). In Scott, a judge's letter critical of local officials resulted
in his being recommended for a reprimand. The Fifth Circuit disallowed the
discipline because Scott's statements were on "public issues" and touched
upon "core first amendment values." 910 F.2d at 212-13 (quoting Morial, 565
F.2d at 1301). Morial, which upheld a provision of the Louisiana judicial code
which required judges to resign before seeking another political office, was
distinguished. Id. at 212.
219. My suggestion that a judge might refuse to obey a mandatory
recusal statute, or sue to enjoin the enforcement of one, is not meant to
impugn known or unknown judges. The practicality of the matter is this:
special interest groups would not be spending millions of dollars to put like-
minded candidates on the bench only to have those candidates removed under
mandatory recusal rules in cases that affect the groups.
While a litigant might be more likely to want to raise the issue, in order
to keep the judge from being disqualified, it would appear that they would
lack standing to do so. But, maybe this too, is not a foreclosed issue. In
Republican Party of Minnesota. v. White, the Party's interest in the case as
plaintiffs was based on their claim that the prohibition made them "unable to
learn [the judge's] views and support or oppose his candidacy accordingly."
536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
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statements that the judge made while campaigning for the office
been denied the privileges of the office? If holding judicial office
entitles one to the privileges of that office, including presiding over
cases that fall within the court's jurisdiction, would a mandatory
recusal rule,22° imposed against judges who had announced their
positions during campaigns, violate the First Amendment because it
penalizes the judge for exercising those rights?
Few would likely question that Judge Griffen in Arkansas
should be disqualified from hearing an employment discrimination
case brought by the terminated coach. Indeed, existing ethics
provisions would suggest that recusal was required. Should recusal
likewise be required if the judge's comments were made during a
campaign? For example, if in response to a question concerning his
views on employment discrimination, Judge Griffen had responded
that he fully supported laws that deter racially motivated firings,
should the university's motion for recusal be granted in a
subsequent discrimination case brought by a terminated minority
employee? More specifically, could the Arkansas Judicial
Commission force the judge's recusal' under a mandatory recusal
provision patterned after the ABA proposal?
Assume instead that the state of Mississippi passed a
domestic partnership act enabling those who, despite their gender,
have cohabited together for at least six continuous months under
circumstances in which at least one is responsible for the other's
financial welfare to have certain privileges otherwise reserved for
married persons. If a domestic partner sued and alleged that the
220. Justice Kennedy recognized that "legislative bodies, judicial
committees, and professional associations" have the right to promulgate
standards of judicial conduct. Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR
UNITED STATES JUDGES (1999)). But he made clear that the right to
promulgate standards is not unlimited. Id. ("Yet these standards may not be
used by the State to abridge the speech of aspiring judges in a judicial
campaign.").
221. This definition is purely hypothetical, but draws upon some
suggested definitions of domestic partner. See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign
Foundation, Domestic Partners Definition, at
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/WorkLife/GetInformed2/The
_Issues/DomesticPartnersDefinition/DomesticPartnersDefinition.htm
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privileges were withheld by, for example, an employer, a court
would interpret and apply the statute, a task that judges perform
countless times each year, based on established principles of
statutory construction.
If individuals claiming to be domestic partners filed a claim
under the statute and learned that the case had been placed on
Judge Wilkerson's docket, should Judge Wilkerson recuse himself,
either sua sponte or upon motion? That question would be
answered under existing recusal rules, but if Mississippi had
adopted a mandatory recusal provision requiring recusal of a judge
who had made "a public statement that commits, or appears to
commit, the judge with respect to an issue," could Judge Wilkerson
refuse to recuse himself, based upon his claim that his statements
were protected First Amendment speech? Similarly, if Judge
Wilkerson's statements had been in answer to a questionnaire,
during a campaign, seeking his view on domestic partnerships,
could he nonetheless insist on hearing the case since his view had
been expressed as fundamental First Amendment campaign/€222
speech? These questions were neither raised nor considered by
the Mississippi Supreme Court, which gratuitously endorsed recusal
as a means of assuring an impartial judiciary: "the objects of judicial
prejudice are entitled to seek a level playing field through recusal
motions. ,223
Another case raising questions about the state's ability to
solve the White dilemma with mandatory recusal statutes is In re
224Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, which involved a
Washington Supreme Court justice who was sanctioned for11 225
speaking at a pro-life rally. The Washington Supreme Court
(2004).
222. Conversely, would the party that claimed the protection of the
statute have a due process right to disqualify the judge? See infra notes 194-
208 and accompanying text. Applying the Tumey standard, would the
situation offer a "possible temptation to the average man ... not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true[?]" Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
223. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d at 1016. Rather than undertaking to "calm
the waters," as the court viewed the Commission's request, the court said it
should instead "help[] our citizens to spot the crocodiles." Id.
224. 955 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1998).
225. Justice Sanders was incorrectly introduced at the rally as the
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disallowed the sanction broadly holding that:
A judge does not surrender First Amendment
rights upon becoming a member of the
judiciary.... In a system.., in which judges are
elected, they are, in effect, always seeking
reelection. If a person does not completely
surrender his or her right to freedom of speech
upon becoming a candidate, then we cannot
expect the candidate to do so once elected to
126judicial office.
The simple truth is that in a state in which judges are subject
to election or retention, they and their opponents are always
candidates and are always campaigning. If the First Amendment
protects the candidate's right to announce views during a campaign,
then arguably it must protect a judge or candidate's right to
announce views all the time. The obvious question remaining is
whether the judge may be required to recuse him or herself because
he or she previously announced views.
G. The Conflicting Constitutional Right Solution: Due Process
Perhaps the difficulties raised by the White decision will be
addressed by adherence to the principles of an equally important
Washington Chief Justice. His comments at the rally, which immediately
followed his investiture, were:
Well, I'm not quite Chief Justice, but I am a Justice.
That's plenty good enough for me. I want to give all of
you my best wishes in this celebration of human life.
Nothing is, nor should be, more fundamental in our legal
system than the preservation and protection of innocent
human life. By coincidence, or perhaps by providence, my
formal induction to the Washington State Supreme Court
occurred about an hour ago. I owe my election to many of
the people who are here today and I'm here to say thank
you very much and good luck. Our mutual pursuit of
justice requires a lifetime of dedication and courage. Keep
up the good work.
Id. at 371.
226. Id. at 375 (internal citations omitted).
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constitutional right - the right to due process. The cases that are
creating the new judicial landscape were brought by four categories
of litigants: judges, judicial candidates, voters, and party leaders.
Each asserted a First Amendment right to either speak or hear.
Judges and judicial candidates have raised the First
Amendment issue in three ways. Some candidates, in advance of a
campaign, have sought declaratory judgments that campaign
restrictions are unconstitutional. Others have sought injunctions to
prohibit judicial campaign committees from enforcing certain
campaign prohibitions. Still others have asserted the First
Amendment as a defense in disciplinary actions brought against
them for conduct and speech used during their campaigns or after
they took the bench.27
On a few occasions, a judge or judicial candidate has joined
forces with others.m In White, for example, among the plaintiffs
. 229
was the Republican Party of Minnesota. The party alleged that
prohibiting judges from announcing their views affected their
members' ability to cast intelligent votes in judicial elections.
Specifically, the party claimed that because the clause kept a
judicial candidate from announcing views on matters of interest to
227. In one interesting case demonstrating an extreme attempted
application of White, a former judicial candidate sued the New York
Commission on Judicial Conduct following his admonition for an ethics
violation, charging that the Commission was required to reopen his case and
annul his discipline in light of White. La Cava v. N.Y. State Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct, 299 F. Supp. 2d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
La Cava and the Commission had stipulated the facts of the matter in
1999. La Cava had agreed to an admonition from the Commission as
discipline for violating the state's commitment clause. La Cava filed an
application to reopen three years after the admonition. After that application
was denied, he filed his lawsuit in March 2003. The federal court dismissed La
Cava's complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 178-79.
228. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text discussing how the
presence of a voter and a party leader as plaintiffs was one factor the court
cited as a reason to resist a Younger abstention in Spargo v. Commission of
Judicial Conduct.
229. Other plaintiffs in White included the Indian Asian American
Republicans of Minnesota, the Republican Seniors, the Young Republican
League of Minnesota, the Minnesota College Republicans, the Minnesota
African American Republic Council, and the Muslim Republicans. See
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
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party members, they were "unable to learn those views and support
or oppose [a candidate] accordingly. '"23
While the Supreme Court's opinion in White focused on, the
candidate's First Amendment rights, the right of the party
member-that is, the voter-to hear the candidate's speech was an
important underlying principle. 231 Justice Scalia, for example,
relying on two voters' rights cases, cautioned that:
The greater power to dispense with elections
altogether does not include the lesser power to
conduct elections under conditions of state-
imposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses
to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of
the democratic process, it must accord the
participants in that process.., the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles. 3'
Justice Kennedy was even more emphatic about the
importance of the voter's right to hear: "What Minnesota may not
do... is censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide
230. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
231. This underlying theme arose logically from the core of the First
Amendment, recognized universally as protecting political speech. The free
exchange of ideas is that which promotes public discourse and, ultimately,
brings about political and social change, prompted by the public's selection of
those who lead the government. Thus, the Court has concluded that the First
Amendment has its "fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
[I]t is of particular importance that candidates have the
unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that
the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates'
personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues
before choosing among them on election day. Mr. Justice
Brandeis' observation that in our country "public
discussion is a political duty" applies with special force to
candidates for public office.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
232. White, 536 U.S.at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); accord Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424-25
(1988).
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for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary
judicial officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the
right of the voters, not the State."' 3
Accepting the First Amendment rights of judges, judicial
candidates, and voters, how are those rights reconciled when they
conflict with equally fundamental constitutional rights of others?
How does the First Amendment right fare in the face of another
equally compelling constitutional right, the right of litigants to have
fair, impartial, and independent arbiters of the facts and law in their
cases?
The potential conflict between the First Amendment rights
of judges and voters and the due process rights of litigants, although
in a slightly different form, was recognized in Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion: "[E]ven aside from what judicial candidates
may say while campaigning, the very practice of electing judges
undermines [the compelling state] interest" in having "an actual
and perceived ... impartial judiciary."23  Explaining her concern,
Justice O'Connor described judges as having a "personal stake" in
the outcome of cases and as being motivated to "favor[] donors." 235
Justice O'Connor mused that judges must be aware that certain
rulings will hurt their reelection efforts, bemoaned the escalating
expense of judicial campaigns, and acknowledged that fundraising
efforts can undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary and
leave judges "feeling indebted to certain parties or interest
groups.236
233. Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
234. Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 788-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This terminology of
"personal stake" comes from the Court's cases discussing whether due process
is violated by judges who preside over cases despite personal interest in the
outcome. See infra notes 243-46.
236. Id. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's "leave it to
honor" discussion, see id. at 793-96, finds some opposition in an early due
process case, in which the Court found that the paltry sum of twelve dollars,
paid to a justice of the peace only when a defendant was convicted, violated
the due process clause.
[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial
procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the
highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it
[Vol. 3
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But it was Justice Scalia who cited the Court's seminal cases
on due process violations arising from biased judges, albeit for the
purpose of belittling the dissent's concerns about judges being
237
motivated by their reelection prospects. If it violates due process
for a judge to "sit in a case in which ruling one way.., increases his
prospects for reelection, then - quite simply - the practice of
electing judges is itself a violation of due process., 238 Justice Scalia
no without danger of injustice. Every procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused, denies the latter due process of law.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
237. In the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia included the following laundry
list of citations:
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. at 523, 531-534 (1927) (judge
violated due process by sitting in a case in which his
financial interest would be benefited by his ruling against
one party); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
822-825 (1986) (same); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,
58-62 (same); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215-
216 (1971) (per curiam) (judge violated due process by
sitting in a case in which one of the parties had
successfully sued him); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,
905 (1997) (judge would violate due process if judge ruled
against one who did not bribe him in order to hide fact
that judge regularly ruled for those who did bribe him); In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137-139 (1955) (judge violated
due process by sitting in the criminal trial of defendant
whom he had indicted).
White, 536 U.S. at 776.
238. Id. at 782. Justice Scalia was apparently referring to Justice
Ginsburg's observation that the judicial obligation to decide cases based on
the facts and law, and not based on preannounced viewpoints, "corresponds to
the litigant's right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to an 'impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and
criminal cases."' Id. at 813 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242
(1980)).
Perhaps demonstrating wishful thinking, a United States District Court
in the Southern District of New York recently credited Justice Ginsberg's
above-quoted statement to the majority. In Feinberg v. Katz, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1677 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2003), the parties were at odds over whether an
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discarded the premise he discovered quickly by returning to his
"original intent" view of the Constitution.29
But the litigant's right to due process was not before the
Court in White. Whereas Justice Scalia's view of the larger question
- the constitutionality of judicial elections - is obvious, the parallel
question - whether forcing a litigant to try a case before a judge
who has expressed his or her view on the matter - is, arguably, not
so easily discarded as the majority suggested.24°
The conflict between the First Amendment rights of judges
or judicial candidates and the due process rights of litigants may
arise in at least two ways. First, the issue may underlie a pretrial
motion to recuse or disqualify a judge. Second, the issue may arise
post-trial, in either a motion to set aside the verdict, a motion for
new trial, or a petition for habeas corpus, when facts not previously
known come to the attention of the parties.
In the first situation, a litigant armed with a copy of a
judge's campaign materials, television advertisements, answers to
special interest group's questionnaires, and newspaper interviews
will move the judge to disqualify himself or herself based on actual
or perceived bias. Before White, the litigant would rarely have
more than campaign brochures and advertisements. When the
campaign was general, the litigant would have little more than a
attorney who served as an arbitrator should have been disqualified in a later-
related case from serving as counsel. In discussing the distinctions between
the role of arbitrator and judge, the court noted that unlike judges, partisan
arbitrators are not expected to be neutral.
That neutrality is one cornerstone of what constitutes a
judge's role should be beyond dispute. In a recent
Supreme Court case, involving the free speech rights of
judges, the Court reiterated that there is a "judicial
obligation to avoid prejudgment," which "corresponds to
the litigant's right, protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to 'an impartial and
disinterested tribunal.. .. "
Id. at n.6 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)
(quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,242 (1980))).
239. White, 536 U.S. at 768-82.
240. But see infra notes 77-78, 238 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia
has often announced his views on issues that were pending before the Court.
On occasion, he has disqualified himself, but not uniformly.
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hunch that the judge was predisposed against the litigant.
Defendants in criminal cases, for example, might feel concern
should their case be tried by judges who campaigned on "law and
order" or "tough on crime" platforms.24' Their concern, however,
certainly would not support a claim that the judge's participation in
the case would violate due process.
After White, however, a litigant's arsenal to support a
Motion to Disqualify will likely be much more formidable. It may
include a judge's answers to specific questions about sentencing
practices, opinions on the applications of civil rights, or viewpoints
on prior decisions reached by other courts. A defendant charged
with child sexual abuse may learn that a judge scheduled to hear the
case has said that sexual offenders should receive maximum
sentences, that pedophiles are incapable of rehabilitation, or that a
great challenge for the criminal justice system is recidivism among
pedophiles. Now, instead of general, ambiguous comments, a
litigant may have evidence that the judge may be "predisposed to
find against, 242 the defendant.
Suppose instead that a litigant is a plaintiff in a civil action
against a medical doctor and a hospital, alleging malpractice and
requesting punitive damages. The plaintiff learns that the judge
responded to questionnaires submitted by special interest groups.
The groups asked questions about "frivolous lawsuits" and
"escalating damage awards." The judge's responses indicated
support for pending legislation to set maximum amounts for
damage awards. Ultimately, the judge was endorsed by the groups,
which gave a substantial amount of money to the judge's campaign
fund. The judge may be facing reelection and may once again need
the support of the groups. The plaintiff gathers these documents
and files them as exhibits with the Motion to Disqualify.
Does either litigant have a due process claim if the judge
refuses recusal? Do the constitutional limits on judicial recusal,
drawn by the Court at the due process line, apply in these cases?
The decisions on when judicial interest or bias rises to the
241. In fact, some judge's platforms have advised defendants of this fact.
See infra notes 83, 91, 105.
242. White, 536 U.S. at 813 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall,
446 U.S. at 242).
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level of a due process violation are not easy to apply. If the cases
are bound by their facts, then a violation of due process, based on
judicial bias, will rarely be found. When, for example, a judge is
compensated only when the judge rules in favor of a particular
243party, due process is violated. A judge who is being bribed by one
243. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Tumey is perhaps the most
frequently cited of the Court's due process cases that concern judicial
neutrality. In Tumey, state law bestowed jurisdiction in the town mayor to try
certain offenses without a jury. Id. at 516-17. The mayor's decision in such a
case was subject to review in the Court of Common Pleas only upon the filing
of a bill of exceptions. Id. at 517. The judgment of the mayor was conclusive,
unless the court found that it was "clearly unsupported by the weight of the
evidence as to indicate some misapprehension or mistake or bias on the part
of the trial court, or a willful disregard of duties." Id. Statutes also provided
that the mayor would "receive or retain the amount of his costs in each case,
in addition to his regular salary, as compensation for hearing.., cases." Id. at
520. Tumey was convicted and fined. He challenged the mayor's right to try
him, alleging that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the mayor should be
disqualified from the case because of the mayor's pecuniary interest.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court agreed with Tumey and
reversed his conviction.
The Court tracked the history of judicial disqualification, noting that
"[t]here was at the common law the greatest sensitiveness over the existence
of any pecuniary interest, however small or infinitesimal, in the justices of the
peace." Id. at 525. Despite the small amount received by the mayor in
Tumey's case (twelve dollars), the Court concluded that
[w]e can not regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such
an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling or
insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each
defendant... that the prospect of such a loss by the
Mayor should weigh against his acquittal.
Id. at 532.
Similarly in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), the Court
invalidated a system in which the mayor's salary, as judge, was not contingent
on conviction, but in which the "revenue produced from a mayor's court
provides a substantial portion of a municipality's funds." Id. at 59 (quoting
Monroeville v. Ward, 271 N.E.2d 757, 761 (1971)). Of importance in Ward is
the Court's expansion of the due process principle outlined in Tumey. The
Court rejected the argument that the principle announced in Tumey was
intended to be limited to cases in which the judge shared "directly" in the fees
and costs. Id. at 60. Instead, the Court, drawing from more general language
in Tumey, expressed the test as one of "possible temptation to the average
man." Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532). "This... is a 'situation in which
an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent
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defendant in a criminal case but not another, and who rules to
244
camouflage that fact, violates due process. Similarly, judges who
sue, or have been sued, by a party to the action, and judges who
have a "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary" interest in
positions, one partisan and the other judicial, [and] necessarily involves a lack
of due process of law ..... Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534).
244. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997). The petitioner in Bracy
argued that he was denied his right to a fair trial because he was tried by a
judge who accepted bribes in some cases and, as a means of hiding his
corruption, was biased in favor of the prosecution in other cases. Bracy had
not bribed the judge, Thomas J. Maloney, one of the Operation Greylord
judges who was later convicted of taking bribes in criminal cases. See id. at
901; United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1995). But because
Maloney was "fixing" other murder cases around the same time as Bracy's
case, he argued that Maloney "had an interest in [his] conviction... [in order]
to deflect suspicion that he was taking bribes in other cases...." Bracy, 520
U.S. at 901. The case arose after Maloney's conviction, when the petitioner,
sentenced to death, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition was
dismissed by the district court who found that it did not contain sufficient
specificity or good cause to warrant discovery. United States ex rel. Collins v.
Welborn, 868 F. Supp. 950, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The Seventh Circuit, in a
divided opinion, affirmed the dismissal. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 696
(7th Cir. 1996). Thus, the issue on certiorari was whether petitioner should
have been given an opportunity to conduct discovery in the case, not whether
a due process violation had been established. The Supreme Court
commented, however, that "there is no question that, if it could be proved,
such compensatory, camouflaging bias on Maloney's part in petitioner's own
case would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Bracy, 520 U.S. at 905. Finding that the presumption that public officials
properly discharge their duties had been solidly rebutted by the bribery
conviction of the judge, the Court reversed the dismissal and remanded to
permit discovery. Id. at 909-10.
245. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971) (per curiam). In
Johnson, a seemingly simple case, a trial judge, alleged to be biased against
civil rights workers, found the defendant, a civil rights worker, in contempt
and sentenced him to serve four months in jail for "walking between the space
reserved for jurors and county officers and the judge." Id. at 212. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial before a new judge, not
based on the affidavits of bias filed by counsel in the case, but because the
judge had previously been sued successfully by the defendant for civil rights
violations. Id. at 215. Significantly the Court ordered the recusal on a sparse
record because the judge was "so enmeshed in matters involving petitioner as
to make it most appropriate for another judge to sit." Id. at 215-16.
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the outcome of the case violate due process by remaining as
246. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826 (1986). In one of
the few civil cases alleging that judicial bias violated the litigant's due process
rights, the Court reversed, but did not vacate, a decision of the Alabama
Supreme Court. The facts in Lavoie are complex, but succinctly stated, a
member of the Alabama Supreme Court, Justice Embry, had authored the
court's per curiam opinion in a case involving an issue that was similar to that
raised in two lawsuits which the justice had filed as plaintiff during the
pendency of the case. Id. at 817. The offended parties challenged Justice
Embry's participation in the case as well as the other justices' participation in
a rehearing motion that they filed. Id. Each justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court, potential class members in one of the lawsuits filed by Justice Embry,
refused recusal. Id. at 817-18. The Supreme Court held that Justice Embry's
involvement in the case violated the litigant's due process rights. Id. at 825.
"Justice Embry's opinion for the Alabama Supreme Court had the clear and
immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value
of his own case." Id. at 824. Thus, Justice Embry "acted as a 'judge in his own
case."' Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
Of particular note is this statement by the Court:
We make clear that we are not required to decide whether
in fact Justice Embry was influenced, but only whether
sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court of
Alabama "would offer a possible temptation to the
average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true." The Due Process Clause 'may
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and
who would do their very best to weigh the scale of justice
equally between contending parties.
Id. at 825 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (quoting
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 and Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136) (internal citations
omitted).
The remaining members of the Alabama Supreme Court were not
required to recuse themselves, both because their interests, if any, were not
"direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary," id. at 826 (quoting Tumey, 273
U.S. at 523), and, perhaps, because of the "rule of necessity." Id. at 825.
(citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980) ("accepting appellant's
expansive contentions might require the disqualification of every judge in the
State.").
Once the Court determined that Justice Embry's participation violated
the litigant's due process rights, the Court turned to a matter of first
impression: whether the decision made by a multi-judge panel should be
vacated because of Justice Embry's participation. Id. at 827. Because the
decision was divided 5-4, and Justice Embry's participation was vital and
decisive, the Court concluded that the "'appearance of justice' will best be
served by vacating the decision and remanding for further proceedings." Id. at
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jurists in the case.
But if the underlying themes espoused in those cases may be
applied generally to much different facts, then due process
violations based on judicial bias should be found in the post-White
landscape far more frequently.
Arguably, the Court itself has suggested that a more general
application is appropriate, acknowledging that the test for a due
process violation, while imprecise, must cover more than actual,
provable bias. "[Olur system of law has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."247
In attempting to devise a standard to apply to other facts, Justice
Taft, for a unanimous court, stated: "[e]very procedure which
828.
247. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. Michigan law allowed a judge to sit as a
one-person grand jury. Murchison, a policeman, was called as a witness before
such a grand jury to testify about suspected gambling in Detroit, as well as
about bribery of police officers. A second witness, White, was similarly
questioned, but refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. White was
cited for contempt and Murchison was indicted for perjury. Both were tried
by the same judge who had conducted the grand jury, despite their objection.
The Supreme Court nullified the procedure, holding that:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual
bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.
To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no
man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in
the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with
precision. Circumstances and relationships must be
considered. This Court has said, however, that "every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge ... not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true between the State and the accused, denies
the latter due process of law." Such a stringent rule may
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and
who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice
equally between contending parties. But to perform its
high function in the best way "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."
Id. at 136 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532; Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11, 14 (1954)) (internal citations omitted.).
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would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true ... denies ... due process of law." 248
Would a criminal court judge who had espoused strong
views about sexual offenders "hold the balance nice, clear, and
true" in an accused sexual offender's trial? Would a judge who had
publicly supported damage maximums, now faced with the
constitutionality of a statutory maximum, be tempted to ignore the
burden of proof? Would a candidate for reelection, previously
endorsed by special interest groups supportive of damage limits in
malpractice cases and desirous of their financial support, have a
personal stake in rulings in malpractice cases?
The second situation in which a litigant may raise a due
process claim arising out of judicial partiality arises after trial. The
litigant who has discovered facts supporting a Motion to Disqualify
may file the motion after the trial as part of a Motion for New Trial
or a Motion to Set Aside a Verdict. In a criminal case, the motion
may be filed after conviction and appeal as grounds for finding a
constitutional violation on post-conviction or federal habeas corpus.
It should be expected that litigants facing significant loss of liberty,
particularly those with death sentences, will more aggressively
litigate due process claims against judges. Thus, those charged with
capital offenses and those already convicted and sentenced to death
will undoubtedly structure claims for relief based on arguments that
a trial judge's bias or interest violated their due process rights.
The easy answer is that due process was not meant to
stretch so far. Courts can engage in a number of methods to reach
that facile conclusion. After all, judges, like jurors, are presumed to
follow their oath, and evil motives should not be subscribed to our
elected officials. The rule of necessity, at the very least, would
undermine such an extension of due process. In the end, since it is
a matter of perspective, claims of due process violations are
unlikely to be any more viable than the other solutions employed as
248. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. While Justice Taft offered the test in a
criminal case, and thus was concerned with holding the balance true "between
the State and the accused," id., the right to due process in a state court is
equally guaranteed in a civil proceeding between private parties.
[Vol. 3
A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE
a result of White.
CONCLUSION
The five-four decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White will continue to foster disrespect for the American justice
system. The speech and conduct which White sanctions will become
commonplace among those vying for the bench. The same speech
and conduct, however, will undermine the public's perception of
fairness in the courts. As the public's confidence in the fairness of
the system declines, so will their respect for the judiciary. And,
eroding respect will challenge the very viability of the justice system
as an appropriate means for resolving disputes.
States can change rules, alter selection methods, or fund
campaigns, but none of those "solutions" will alleviate the problems
created by diminished respect for the judiciary. Neither can the
effects of disrespect be eliminated by a blind, albeit patriotic, faith
in the voters or the candidates. While states may adopt rigorous
judicial recusal standards, those standards may ultimately not
survive constitutional challenge.
Our system does provide a viable mechanism for addressing
these problems. That mechanism is a renewed commitment to
fundamental due process. If, in reality, we are committed to the
principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice," 24 9 then
the due process rights of litigants must be more essential than the
First Amendment rights of those who seek public office. If we are
to sustain the long-held reverence for the American justice system,
if justice is to remain blind seeing "no difference in the parties
concerned," then courts must rededicate themselves to the most
fundamental aspect of due process - actual and perceived fairness
to all.
249. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
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